This is the second of two articles examining rising support for the Parti Québécois. The first explains how the support for independence is not rising among young Quebecers.
A surprising resurgence of popularity for the Parti Québécois is not driven by growing support for sovereignty. But many Quebecers nonetheless identify themselves as mainly sovereigntist. What underpins this preference? Beyond an obvious preference for sovereignty, which of their views distinguish them from other Quebecers?
Itâs not their opinions about major policy challenges of the day. On health care, affordable housing and the environment, there is no great divide. Itâs also not the role of the state. What sets them apart are grievances with our federal system coupled with a strong sense of identity, our 2024 edition of the Confederation of Tomorrow survey shows.
On health care, about one in two Quebecers lack confidence in their ability to get medical treatment within a reasonable period of time. This proportion is the same for those who identify as mainly sovereigntists and those who identify as mainly federalists.
On housing, roughly the same proportion of Quebecers (just under one in two) disapprove of how the province is managing affordability. But, again, there is no difference in opinion between those who identify as sovereigntists and those who donât.
On the environment, same pattern. Sovereigntists and federalists are divided more or less evenly between those who agree and those who disagree that protecting the environment is more important than protecting jobs.
Looking beyond single issues, maybe Quebec sovereigntists are more pro-government, more supportive of the state (at least the provincial one) as a tool for advancing collective goals? This also does not appear to be the case.
In fact, Quebecers who identify mainly as sovereigntists are a little more likely than average to prefer smaller governments or the status quo instead of larger governments that offer more services. And sovereigntists are more likely than federalists to say governments have a negative impact on most peopleâs lives. Federalists tend to see governmentsâ impact as positive.
Perhaps most interestingly, the spectrum of left-right ideology is almost identical among sovereigntists and federalists. In both groups, about half place themselves in the centre, a quarter on the left, and a quarter on the right.
What distinguishes sovereigntists are their views on two other types of question.
The first of these is obvious: federalism. It goes without saying that sovereigntists are much less convinced of the merits of Canadaâs federal system. Sovereigntists are twice as likely as the Quebec average to disagree that federalism offers more advantages than disadvantages for their province.
And a strong majority of sovereigntists believe Quebec lacks its rightful share of influence in national decisions and receives less than its fair share of federal spending. Three in four sovereigntists (75 per cent) favour a shift in powers from Ottawa to Quebec City compared with a provincial average of 42 per cent.
The second set of opinions that distinguishes sovereigntists from other Quebecers relates to identity, with elements of both pride and grievance. Most Quebecers feel a sense of attachment to their province. But sovereigntists are much more likely to feel strongly attached (72 per cent) compared with the provincial average (44 per cent). Forty-three percent of sovereigntists identify as a Quebecer only â rather than as a Quebecer who is also Canadian â compared with the provincial average of only 17 per cent.
Here we go again? Making sense of the PQâs rise in the polls
Albertaâs Bill 18 is another strategy from Quebecâs playbook
It is this strong sense of Quebec identity that many sovereigntists feel is rejected by the rest of Canada. Overall, 30 per cent of Quebecers disagree that their cultural identity is respected in Canada today. For sovereigntists, itâs 52 per cent.
Conversely, 40 per cent of Quebecers overall strongly agree that their culture is misunderstood by the rest of Canada. For sovereigntists, itâs 67 per cent. And, finally, almost nine in 10 sovereigntists (88 per cent) say the French language in Quebec is threatened.
The importance of identity in underpinning support for sovereignty will come as no surprise for those most familiar with the sovereignty movement or Quebec politics. But Canadian political leaders would do well to keep it in mind as we approach a federal election expected by October 2025.
At the moment, many of the flashpoints in federal-provincial relations relate to the federal price on carbon (which doesnât apply in Quebec because of its cap-and-trade system), or to the use of the spending power to advance federal priorities.
But promises and policies in these areas are not likely to shrink or spark support for sovereignty, particularly if the PQ eventually returns to government. It will be federal (and ârest of Canadaâ) reactions to issues related to language and identity. This doesnât mean keeping quiet; rather, it means being politically aware and astute. The worst possible option is thinking that these issues donât exist.
Methodological details
The Confederation of Tomorrow surveys are annual studies conducted by an association of some of the countryâs leading public policy and socio-economic research organizations: the Environics Institute for Survey Research, the Centre of Excellence on the Canadian Federation, the Canada West Foundation, the Centre dâanalyse politique â Constitution FĂ©dĂ©ralisme, the Brian Mulroney Institute of Government and the First Nations Financial Management Board.
The surveys give voice to Canadians about the major issues shaping the future of the federation and their political communities.
The 2024 study surveyed 6,036 adults and was conducted between Jan. 13 and April 13 (82 per cent of the responses were collected between Jan. 17 and Feb. 1) with 94 per cent of the responses collected online. The remaining responses were collected by telephone from respondents living in the North or on First Nations reserves.
The results presented above are based on surveys of 1,621 Quebecers, 1,297 of whom were francophones.
Survey responses are weighted by age, gender, region, education, Indigenous identity and home language to be representative of the actual distribution of the adult Canadian population.
The 2018 Quebec provincial election was notable not only because it brought to power a new political party â the Coalition avenir QuĂ©bec â but because it was a historic defeat for the sovereigntist Parti QuĂ©bĂ©cois, reduced at that time to only 10 seats in the National Assembly. The party suffered a further setback in the vote four years later, winning only three seats.
With the PQ having been all but erased from the provincial political scene, surely that meant the decades-long debate about whether Quebec should remain part of Canada could finally be laid to rest.
Not so fast. Public opinion polls in the province have captured a dramatic change recently. In mid-2023, the PQ experienced an initial boost that saw them pull ahead of the other opposition parties. Then in the fall, an even larger boost propelled them to the top, well ahead of the governing CAQ.
If an election were held today, the polls now project the PQ would return to power with a majority.
And with that shift, we are now talking about a referendum again.
Does the growing support for the PQ signal a resurgence of support for sovereignty in the province?
In a word: no.
The proportion of francophone Quebecers who identify as âmainly a sovereigntistâ has changed little over the six years covered by the annual Confederation of Tomorrow survey.
In 2024, only 23 per cent of respondents described themselves as mainly a sovereigntist â which is more than those who said they were mainly a federalist (18 per cent), but not much different from previous years. A slightly greater share (29 per cent) placed themselves in between the two options, while another 23 per cent said they were neither one nor the other.
The same pattern held when Quebecers were asked if they agreed that Quebec sovereignty is an idea whose time has passed. In 2024, 51 per cent of Quebec francophones agreed, which is unchanged not only compared to when this current series of surveys began in 2019 but also to when the question was asked more than 20 years ago.
To the extent that there has been some change, it is that the proportion disagreeing has dropped off somewhat, while the share that is unsure has increased.
The picture is no more encouraging for the sovereignty movement when we look specifically at younger adults. In 2024, only 16 per cent of Quebec francophones aged 18 to 34 identified as mainly sovereignties and only 26 per cent disagreed that Quebec sovereignty is an idea whose time has passed.
In both cases, these proportions are lower than those for older generations today and lower for this same age group two decades ago. Millennial and GenZ Quebecers are less sovereigntist than their GenX or Boomer counterparts.
Even the current supporters of the Parti Québécois were not one-sidedly sovereigntist. Yes, PQ supporters (53 per cent) were more likely than those who support the CAQ (18 per cent) to identify as mainly sovereigntist.
But that still leaves 39 per cent of PQ supporters who said they were either in between the two options or neither, while seven per cent said they were mainly federalist. One in three PQ supporters (33 per cent) agreed that the time for Quebec sovereignty has passed.
So what explains the resurgence of the PQ, if not a renewed interest in sovereignty?
Itâs likely a straightforward combination of government missteps and the failure of the other opposition parties to capitalize on them. The proportion of Quebecers dissatisfied with the way things are going jumped 14 percentage points between 2023 and 2024 to 46 per cent from 34 per cent.
Dissatisfaction with the provinceâs management of the health-care system (which was already high) also grew over the past year.
The proportion seeing the Quebec provincial government as the one that best represents them dropped, while the proportion saying that no government is best more than doubled to 24 per cent from 11 per cent.
The Quebec Liberal Party remains adrift without a leader and QuĂ©bec solidaire still hasnât been able to get out of large urban areas. Politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum and the PQ with its more charismatic leader has been able to fill the empty space.
Before federalists conclude that there is nothing to worry about â that the rise of the PQ in the polls is driven more by nightmares about hospital waiting times than by dreams of independence â it is worth recalling the other side of the coin.
While the proportion of francophone Quebecers who identified as mainly sovereigntist is not trending upward, the proportion who identified as mainly federalist remains small â fewer than one in five.
Only 42 per cent of Quebecers agreed that Canadian federalism has more advantages than disadvantages for their province. As well, for the sixth year in a row, our survey found that roughly seven in 10 francophone Quebecers feel the French language in Quebec is threatened.
The absence of a resurgence in support for sovereignty should not be mistaken for an indication of stronger support for federalism.
This is Part 1 of a two-part series. In the second part, the authors will examine in more detail some of the factors that relate to support for sovereignty in Quebec.
Methodological details
The Confederation of Tomorrow surveys are annual studies conducted by an association of some of the countryâs leading public policy and socio-economic research organizations: the Environics Institute for Survey Research, the Centre of Excellence on the Canadian Federation, the Canada West Foundation, the Centre dâanalyse politique â Constitution FĂ©dĂ©ralisme, the Brian Mulroney Institute of Government and the First Nations Financial Management Board.
The surveys give voice to Canadians about the major issues shaping the future of the federation and their political communities.
The 2024 study surveyed 6,036 adults and was conducted between Jan. 13 and April 13 (82 per cent of the responses were collected between Jan. 17 and Feb. 1) with 94 per cent of the responses collected online. The remaining responses were collected by telephone from respondents living in the North or on First Nations reverses.
The results presented above are based on surveys of 1621 Quebecers, 1297 of whom were francophones.
Survey responses are weighted by age, gender, region, education, Indigenous identity and home language to be representative of the actual distribution of the adult Canadian population.
The Trudeau governmentâs latest budget contained a number of splashy items, ranging from housing policy to national defence. In the midst of a national housing crisis and with mounting geopolitical threats, itâs no surprise that these policy areas are getting attention.
Another issue that the government sought to address in the budget is Canadaâs lagging productivity. Itâs perhaps less well understood, but one that will determine Canadaâs ability to fund solutions to our most pressing national challenges. Dusting off the industrial policy playbook may be part of the solution.
Canadaâs productivity challenges arenât new, and arenât news. Economic commentators have been raising flags about them for years. A recent speech by Carolyn Rogers, senior deputy governor of the Bank of Canada, injected some urgency into the discussion.
âYouâve seen those signs that say, âIn emergency, break glass.â Well, itâs time to break the glass,â she said.
In other words, productivity is no longer just a problem. Itâs an emergency.
But why should ordinary Canadians fixate on productivity? Next to the increased cost of living â particularly the cost of shelter â productivity can seem like an abstract concept. Why spend money trying to make firms more efficient when many households are having trouble paying the bills? Itâs an important question that elected officials need to answer.
But productivity isnât a mere statistical artifact. Nor is it something that just pads the corporate bottom line. It determines how much Canadians can produce, and therefore how much weâre able to enjoy.
Investments in productivity â ranging from big ticket items like cutting-edge machinery to improve manufacturing output, to marginal tweaks like better software to improve agricultural output â mean weâre able to produce more goods and services per hour worked. Put simply, it means we get more output for the same amount of effort. Increased productivity means an increased standard of living, and a greater ability to finance important social programs.
Letâs use housing as an example. Several analysts have estimated that Canada is short over three million housing units. That is a daunting number. To meet that goal, we need more output. Unless weâre going to make a massive push to get young people into the building trades or completely reorient our immigration policy to focus on construction workers, we need to build more housing units per worker. In other words, we need more productivity.
Increasing productivity isnât easy. If it was, weâd have already done it. Â Itâs easy enough to tell firms that they ought to invest more in equipment or software. But they need to have the right incentives and the right tools at their disposal.
One potential tool to hit the accelerator is industrial policy. Itâs a broad concept that means different things to different people. The idea that there is a role for the state to nudge private companies in a particular direction is often thought of as antithetical to a market-oriented economy. In reality, weâve always done some form of industrial policy. This ranges from past large-scale interventions to build out Albertaâs oilsands to tax credits for research and development.
Thereâs plenty in the budget that broadly falls under the industrial policy umbrella aimed at bolstering clean technology, artificial intelligence, Indigenous reconciliation and other key priorities.
A cynic could argue that the federal government is merely throwing money at stakeholder groups. Indeed, some skepticism is warranted. After all, if thereâs money to be made on something, why doesnât the private sector just step up?
The trouble is the incentives often donât line up. Letâs take another example: supply chains. Global supply chains normally work like magic. Our highly globalized economy provides us with an array of goods and services previous generations could only have dreamed of.
However, COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have shown that we canât take that stability for granted. Geopolitics, natural disasters and infectious diseases, among other things, can disrupt supply chains. That is inconvenient when weâre talking about trinkets from Amazon. Itâs a disaster when weâre talking about life-saving vaccines. We need to ensure that we donât put all our eggs in one basket. No one wants to have to hoard toilet paper again.
This is where industrial policy can come in. Sometimes there are broader public interests that individual firms donât have the right incentives to address. Thereâs no shortage of examples. Reshoring or shortening supply chains is expensive and can put companies at a competitive disadvantage; firms might face cost barriers to adopting cleaner technologies; they might not see the monetary value in reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples; and they might not have the ability to undertake heavy upfront costs for research and development on the technologies of the future. This is where governments might have a role to play.
Canada wouldnât be the first major country to experiment with industrial policy. Countries ranging from China to Germany are pursuing aggressive industrial policy strategies. Even the United States has embraced industrial policy, perhaps best embodied by the American governmentâs Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS and Science Act. This have led to an explosion of construction activity.
This new activity isnât just building widgets for the sake of creating jobs. It means that a share of the most advanced semiconductors on earth will now be built on American soil, helping to reduce the worldâs dependence on semiconductors produced in Taiwan. Given geopolitical threats in Asia and lingering worries about supply-chain predictability, having these vital inputs built in North America is an unalloyed good. Thereâs a reason why even conservatives like U.S. Senator Marco Rubio want to double down on industrial policy.
That isnât to say that industrial policy is completely uncontroversial, let alone perfect. Itâs not hard to find failed examples of industrial policy initiatives. Governments engaging in industrial policy need a sound strategy, good data and rigorous evaluation. They also need to know when to cut their losses. These are all easier said than done.
Quebec needs solutions to its long-term financial challenges
The sheer size of recent industrial policy initiatives, such as multibillion-dollar electric-vehicle battery manufacturing facilities or tax credits for clean-energy investments, should focus our collective minds on getting value for money. While industrial policy may be necessary to maintain or expand a presence in certain heavy industries that are being generously funded by other countries, the costs can be enormous. We canât simply cut blank cheques. We need to get these investments right more often than not.
Efforts to boost productivity in the medium to long term come at the expense of short-term priorities. Bluntly put, if weâre going to spend a dollar on factory construction rather than health care, we need to make sure thereâs a plausible and attractive payback. One of the key objectives of boosting productivity is enhancing our ability to generate the tax revenue needed to pay for services like health care, after all.
While industrial policy might be a promising avenue to boost productivity, we shouldnât step into it lightly. We need credible, evidence-based policies linked to a coherent strategy rather than ad hoc decisions. We also need strong governance, policy design that attracts private capital rather than replaces it, and effective and timely implementation. Itâs good that the government is thinking about productivity, but itâs not a matter of flipping a switch. We need to get the details right.
Getting these details right is what motivates the IRPPâs Building New Foundations for Economic Growth research program. We will continue to produce and share research aimed at bolstering Canadaâs productivity long after the budget ink is dry.
This article originally appeared in The Hill Times on March 13, 2024Â
With inflation starting to come down, many seem to believe that the affordability crisis is coming to an end. This is not the case for those with low incomes, who will remain squeezed between the high costs of basic needs, and wages and benefits that have not kept pace. Â
Even if the Bank of Canadaâs efforts succeed in bringing overall inflation down to a 2 per cent year over year increase, prices will still be far higher than they were three years ago.    Â
The cost of basic needs such as housing, food and energy may also be the trickiest to address, given the complex dynamics on both the supply and demand sides of the challenge. And focusing efforts solely on prices ignores the fact that some households simply do not have sufficient income to cover the costs of essentials.Â
On housing, the Bank of Canada has acknowledged that interest rates alone will not bring down prices. The fundamental issue is that there are too many people with too few places to live. Governments at all levels need to step in to get housing built as quickly as possible by tackling the barriers facing not-for-profit and private developers. And they also need to take a hard look at the demand side of the equation.Â
Food prices are another area that deserves more targeted analysis. The war in Ukraine led to a spike in grain prices that rippled throughout the world in 2022. Climate change is also wreaking havoc with food prices. Drought in California in 2022 contributed to Canadians paying 11 per cent more for fresh vegetables versus the previous year. And drought in Brazil led to higher coffee and sugar prices. The drought predicted in Canadaâs prairies this summer could contribute to food prices staying high. Interest rate increases and finger-wagging at grocery retailers isnât helping families who are struggling now to put food on the table.Â
With more and more Canadians struggling to afford groceries after they pay bills for rent and utilities, governments can no longer take a wait and see approach. Food and shelter prices are at least 20 per cent higher than they were in 2021. Almost 7 million people in Canada, including 2 million children and forty per cent of single mothers, are living in food insecurity and food bank use is up 80 per cent since 2019. The long-term effects of food insecurity on families and children should be setting off alarm bells. Â
Governments need to step in to ensure that incomes are sufficient to put food on the table. Recently, the Affordability Action Council recommended restructuring and expanding the GST/HST credit aimed at low-income households and renaming it the Groceries and Essentials Benefit. Â
Gasoline prices and home heating costs are also top of mind for many Canadians. Energy prices have been a major driver of inflation, though they have moderated over the past year. The long-term outlook for oil and natural gas prices, however, is for more volatility, a reality that will be the most challenging for lower-income households, who tend to live in more inefficient homes, are unable to afford the upfront costs associated with increasing the efficiency of their home or switching to alternatives such as heat pumps and electric cars. Â
In Canada, governments have largely failed to see the bigger and longer-term picture on energy affordability. Proposed temporary fixes, such as pausing the carbon tax on home heating fuels, could leave low-income households worse off because of the loss of rebate payments. It will also not help households in the long run, since the main drivers behind oil and natural gas prices will be global market forces. Â
The real, lasting affordability solutions to energy prices are those that help households reduce energy use, increase the efficiency of their homes, and reduce their reliance on volatile fossil fuels. Government support for low-income energy efficient home retrofits, heat pumps, and convenient public transit is far more effective than temporary tax changes. Governments should also do more to ensure houses built today are future-fit, with less reliance on fossil fuels and driving, and greater resilience to growing climate change-related risks from wildfire smoke, flooding, and heat waves. Otherwise, the wave of home-building will set Canadians up for decades of recurring affordability crises. Â
In the ongoing fight against inflation, central banks and governments should be working in tandem to better understand the underlying factors behind price increases, to analyze potential future sources of price volatility, and to outline clear steps that can be taken, while taking into consideration the realities of families across the income spectrum. Â
One of the most important roles of governments is to ensure that its people have a roof over their head and food on their table. It is time they step in with bolder interventions, rather than relying solely on the Bank of Canada.Â
Yasmin Abraham is President and Co-Founder of the Kambo Energy Group and a member of the Affordability Action Council.Â
Lisa Rae is Director of System Change at Prosper Canada and a member of the Affordability Action Council.Â
Rachel Samson is Vice President of Research at the Institute for Research on Public Policy, one of the founding organizations of the Affordability Action Council.Â
This winter, COVID-19 is circulating and contributing to the cocktail of respiratory diseases filling emergency rooms across Canada, but governments have shifted the bulk of their attention to dealing with the aftermath of the pandemic.
With the trauma and upheaval of the most disruptive pandemic restrictions behind us, the focus has turned to the affordability crisis and a health-care system about to crack.
But where are the lessons-learned reports from governments?
Academics and civil society have issued papers and reports reviewing the governmentâs performance, most notably, a series on Accountability for Canadaâs COVID-19 Response by the BMJ, formerly the British Medical Journal.
The Centre of Excellence on the Canadian Federation at the IRPP has released its own report in partnership with the Institute on Governance on Resilient Institutions: Lessons Learned from Canadaâs COVID-19 Response.
Reports like ours can set the groundwork, but theyâre not a replacement for reports from governments themselves, which have largely been in short supply. We have neither the resources nor access required for the kind of lessons-learned study this country deserves.
But governments need to understand how they can co-ordinate to respond better to future crises.
Why the lack of reports? It could be that governments simply havenât gotten around to it yet. The federal government recently tasked a panel of experts with a report reviewing the federal approach to pandemic science advice and research coordination. It is set to be published in March.
Alberta released a report in November reviewing legislation impacting its response to COVID-19. But many other governments have not released plans to conduct any reviews at all.
As part of the Resilient Institutions research, we conducted a scan of publicly available reports on COVID-19 issued or commissioned by government.
We took a particular interest in those issued by ministries or departments given their internal perspective of what happened during the pandemic. We reached out to the provincial and territorial clerks to confirm whether reports have been published. We were surprised to find that six provinces havenât made public any ministerial or departmental reports.
For one of the most devastating public policy crises of this century, half of the governments in this country have not published any sort of internal reflection (figure 1). Itâs a very low bar, and yet, almost half of provinces and territories in the country have not met it.
Of the 61 reports we identified, 38 of the public COVID-19 reports were written by auditors general. Auditors general have an important role in government accountability but theyâre limited in their mandate, which is to conduct performance and financial audits. They canât, for example, question whether a decision should have been implemented. They can measure whether the program hit performance targets or stayed on budget, but not whether the government should have implemented the program in the first place.
External expert groups commissioned by governments were responsible for five reports. Expert groups can be helpful in providing an independent assessment of the governmentâs performance. Of course, the merits of this source of reports are dependent on the mandate and composition of these expert panels and what experience they have navigating the complexities of the public service.
But internal reports from governments themselves have advantages. Governments are best placed to understand the processes and structures that went into one of the most challenging policy responses in this century. No one has a better understanding of the governmentâs response to the pandemic than the governments themselves.
None of the 61 reports is a comparative, pan-Canadian pandemic lessons-learned study. Not one has been attempted or even announced. A pan-Canadian study is an inherently difficult task because of the input it needs from each order of government. Thatâs why such an initiative should be initiated by the federal government.
Better co-ordination is necessary to avoid causing harm, especially to underserved communities. Last June, we held the Resilient Institutions conference, where senior officials, academics, and civil society gathered to discuss lessons learned from the pandemic. During the conference, many of the 35 panelists talked about jurisdictional confusion and how treating responsibilities like a game of hot potato led to poor outcomes.
One of the most egregious examples was when provincial border closures prevented students in Listuguj Miâgmaq First Nation from getting to school. The community is on the Quebec side of the border with New Brunswick, and their high school is on the N.B. side.
Another example was how some municipal governments were left with few resources or co-ordination. Kennedy Stewart, former mayor of Vancouver, lamented that he was only able to secure one brief person-to-person call with John Horgan, then-B.C. premier, throughout the entire pandemic.
Without a review to delve into understanding the necessary structures, processes, and relationships needed to prepare for cross-jurisdictional disasters, Canada is in a vulnerable position. Viruses and natural disasters donât respect borders, so governments are all going to have to figure out how to work with each other.
Secondly, governments need to examine the Canadian federationâs robustness, and how flexible and responsive its responses can be. Our institutions largely worked well to implement the governmentâs COVID-19 strategy, but executive federalism, where the prime minister and premiers drive much of the institutional response, was the foundation of the governmentâs approach.
Governments need to figure out a way to work together that doesnât depend on weekly first ministersâ meetings. This is not a sustainable strategy in the medium or long term. As a first step, they must identify the processes and structures that worked best in a far-reaching and vital process only they can launch.
This could be done with a thorough operational review of the committees and working groups that were a part of the federal, provincial, and territorial response to the pandemic. This could happen as part of a pan-Canadian pandemic lessons-learned study.
The pandemic was the first big test this decade of a crisis that required cross-jurisdictional collaboration. Governments need to get a feel for what avenues of communication work. They need to capitalize on the information exchange that occurred and create opportunities for those relationships to continue after the pandemic.
One panellist during the Resilient Institutions conference remarked that after the pandemic started to subside, colleagues from other provinces stopped reaching out, and so did those in the panelistâs office. This is just one example of the âsnap-backâ governments should want to avoid. The federation is better off when governments talk to each other.
Canadians were asked to accept far-reaching restrictions like border closures and curfews, often with little explanation and on short notice. They need assurances that the government acknowledges these costs and are working to ensure that these measures are proportionate and limited in the future. How the government handles itself after the pandemic sets the tone for future crises.
Learning how to learn from mistakes is something governments grapple with. The pandemic is a huge opportunity to do so. The Resilient Institutions report is a start, but itâs up to governments to build on the work in it.
At one time, Canada could boast about its highly respected systems of immigration and higher education. Youâd never know it from reading todayâs headlines.
How did it come to this?
About a decade ago, the federal government made several changes to Canadaâs immigration rules, effectively making it easier for international students to qualify for permanent residency, primarily by allowing them to stay and work after graduation. After three years, permanent residents can apply for Canadian citizenship.
These changes had several goals. Canada wanted to attract a larger share of international students and better compete with other top host countries including the U.S., the U.K. and Australia.
But the changes were also seen as a way to overcome one of the big problems with Canadaâs points-based immigration system: Canada admits many highly trained workers who often have difficulty getting a job in their field because employers donât recognize their foreign educational credentials and work experience.
International students were thought to be the golden ticket. Educated in Canada, they would have the language skills, the Canadian degrees and diplomas, as well as the domestic work experience that employers sought.
For universities and colleges, international students expanded their pool of high-calibre students and brought in additional revenue at a time when domestic enrolment was dropping because of demographic changes. Students from abroad pay much higher tuition fees than domestic students.
The number of international students in Canada studying at all levels reached more than one million at the end of 2023, up 29 per cent from 2022 and up more than 200 per cent from a decade earlier. More than half were in Ontario, with British Columbia as the second most popular destination at 20 per cent.
Many institutions benefited from the new rules, but some more so than others. In Ontario, public colleges, particularly those in northern regions and smaller cities, which were experiencing a more pronounced decline in domestic enrolments, found it difficult to attract international students.
To overcome this roadblock, they began striking agreements with private institutions located in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), the region that most international students prefer.
Under these contracts, a student is admitted to a public college, but the training is provided by private institutions, which are mainly located in the GTA, often in strip malls and office buildings.
The college retains a portion of the fees paid by international students and graduates get a credential from the college, which then qualifies them for a post-graduate work permit and eventually permanent residency. In 2021, 11 Ontario colleges had partnerships with private institutions.
A 2017 review of these partnerships in Ontario by David Trick, a former provincial assistant deputy minister of post-secondary education, concluded they posed risks to academic quality and the reputation of the entire college system. He recommended shutting them down.
The then-Liberal government imposed a moratorium on new partnerships, which was subsequently lifted after the election of a Progressive Conservative (PC) government in 2018.
In 2019, the PC government also cut post-secondary student tuition fees by 10 per cent and imposed a freeze on future tuition fee hikes, which remains in place today. The lost tuition revenue wasnât replaced with higher operating grants.
A 2021 report by the auditor general of Ontario noted that during the four years prior to the pandemic, college tuition revenue from international students increased to $1.75 billion in 2019-20 from $696 million in 2016-17 and accounted for 68 per cent of all tuition fee revenues.
The report also sounded the alarm over the growing popularity of public-private partnerships, finding provincial oversight of these agreements was lacking and there was no strategy to mitigate the risk that such a high reliance on international student enrolment posed for the provinceâs colleges.
The increase in international students extended beyond Ontario colleges. Universities too hopped on the bandwagon. International students at Nova Scotiaâs Cape Breton University account for two-thirds of total enrolment and are the driving force behind its overall enrolment growth in recent years.
A separate auditor general of Ontario report on the financial management of four Ontario universities â Algoma, Nipissing, Ontario Tech and Windsor â noted that the vast majority of students at these institutions were from India, including 85 per cent of students from abroad at Algoma and 60 per cent at Windsor.
Post-secondary institutions rightfully argue that these students bring many benefits to Canadian campuses beyond financial considerations, including diversity and cultural perspectives that provide valuable lessons for Canadian students. They also contribute to Canadaâs highly skilled workforce and help offset labour shortages.
But the rapid influx has raised many concerns too. Incoming students have complained of long processing times for student visas and delays in getting their post-graduate work permits, as well as a shortage of affordable student housing, unethical practices among some student recruiters, and financial and mental health challenges. Some have been forced to turn to food banks.
Others have blamed the student influx for exacerbating Canadaâs housing shortage and putting additional strain on our health-care services.
In response, Immigration Minister Marc Miller announced earlier this year that the federal government will set a cap on international student permits for two years. In 2024, the cap will be set at about 360,000 permits, down 35 per cent from 2023.
The permits will be allocated by province and territory, based on population. The provinces will then distribute the permits among institutions. The cap doesnât apply to masterâs and doctoral programs or the elementary and secondary sectors.
In addition, starting Sept. 1, international students who begin a program under a public-private partnership will no longer be eligible for a post-graduate work permit. This comes on top of previous announcements that raised the cost-of-living requirements for study permit applicants and other regulations.
There has always been much to celebrate about Canadaâs post-secondary education system. We routinely come out near the top of OECD rankings for educational attainment.
Our institutions run the gamut from world-renowned research-intensive universities to small liberal arts institutions and to the wide network of colleges that are supposed to cater to community needs. Presumably, this is what attracted international students in the first place.
All this appears in jeopardy now. Forced to deal with a reduction in international study permits, many institutions are bound to be left struggling.
In Ontario, Laurentian University filed for creditor protection in 2021 and Queenâs University has publicly warned about its financial straits, blaming it on the reduction in tuition fees, high inflation and a decline in international student enrolment during the pandemic. Will governments step in or will we see more go the way of Laurentian?
International students should play an integral role in our immigration system, but they shouldnât be used as a vehicle to keep post-secondary institutions financially afloat. Governments need to restore proper funding to universities and colleges.
A recent report by an Ontario expert panel recommended ending the provinceâs tuition freeze and increasing per-student funding, noting: âMany colleges and universities have passed the point where they could survive financially with only domestic students.â
The Ontario government announced recently a $1-billion funding boost over three years â far short of the $2.5-billion increase recommended by the expert panel.
The institutions need to do their part too. They have been unwilling to acknowledge the fact that a smaller number of domestic students means they need to scale back their operations.
Itâs time to restore the pride we once had in our post-secondary institutions and our immigration system.
Since the House of Commons returned for its fall sitting, affordability has topped the agenda. Â
The government introduced the Affordable Housing and Groceries Act to spur construction of new apartment buildings and increase competition among grocery retailers, and also increased the amount of low-cost financing available to developers and builders of rental units. Â
Canadians, particularly those with lower incomes, are hurting and politicians are finally getting the message. Although the inflation rate has moderated in recent months, prices remain at high levels and the rise in the prices of groceries and shelter continues to outpace headline inflation.Â
But tackling inflation alone wonât be enough to make life affordable for many Canadians. Almost seven million people â including 1.8 million children â faced food insecurity in 2022, up from about six million in 2019. Â
The health consequences extend beyond poor nutrition. Studies show food-insecure households spend less on other essential needs such as housing, transportation and medicine.Â
What should be done? Â
For starters, the federal government should move ahead with its long-promised reform of employment insurance. Ottawa has pledged to modernize the program to reflect changes in the labour market and to cover a greater proportion of workers but Canadians are still waiting.Â
Under the programâs current eligibility rules, a claimant must have worked between 420 and 700 hours in the preceding 12 months, depending on where they live, to collect benefits. A grocery store clerk in Corner Brook, Nfld. requires 490 hours to qualify while her counterpart in Toronto requires 665 hours.Â
Those who do qualify receive payment equivalent to 55 per cent of previous earnings. That same Toronto grocery store clerk who works full time and earns the minimum wage would receive $1,456 a month on EI â in a city where the average rent for a vacant one-bedroom apartment is $2,541. Â
A 2022 IRPP commentary called for a uniform 420-hour eligibility requirement across the country, as was the case during the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as increasing the earnings replacement rate to 60 per cent. Â
Although it has remained quiet on the EI front, the federal government has moved to expand Canadaâs social safety net, including the introduction of the new Canadian dental care plan, a $10-a-day child-care program, a proposed Canada disability benefit and a one-time grocery rebate. This is a good starting point, but itâs not enough.Â
As well, under the terms of its supply-and-confidence agreement with the NDP, it has pledged to introduce legislation this fall to implement a national pharmacare program. Â
The dental care plan is the biggest expansion to public medicare in 50 years. It is being rolled out in phases starting with children under 12. The government estimates that once the plan is fully in place at the end of 2025, it will cover up to nine million low- and modest-income uninsured Canadians â a major step forward for a country that is widely seen as a laggard compared to its OECD counterparts in providing dental care.Â
However, a recent study notes that even Canadians with private dental insurance face barriers to care because of high deductibles, cost-sharing and coverage limits. It recommends providing Canadians with universal coverage for a limited core of essential dental services through the creation of a federally funded armâs-length agency, while leaving private providers to cover other services.Â
The study also acknowledges that a âforceful mechanismâ may be necessary to ensure that dental providers opt into the plan and to prevent extra billing. Â
The rollout of the federal governmentâs $10-a-day child care plan has helped boost the participation rate of women with young children in the workforce, according to an analysis by TD Economics.Â
However, the report estimates that commitments to create new spaces fall far short of demand across Canada. One reason is that not-for-profit service providers have difficulty accessing private capital to fund expansions, according to researcher Gordon Cleveland. A shortage of early childhood educators is also putting the programâs success at risk, he says.Â
Whatâs more, in a separate paper, Cleveland argues the $9 billion a year allotted in funding to finance the program likely isnât enough to meet the $10-a-day target in high-cost jurisdictions such as British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario, and that a supplementary financing program will likely be needed in those provinces.Â
Meanwhile, legislation to implement the new Canada disability benefit received royal assent in June, but the federal government has yet to develop the regulations to implement it. About 6.2 million people with disabilities live in Canada and 23 per cent of them live in poverty, twice the rate of those without disabilities â a situation that has been exacerbated by high inflation.Â
Advocates called the benefit a âonce-in-a-generation opportunity to break the link between disability and poverty,â but cautioned that the program must not repeat the mistakes of existing benefits and tax credits. Â
Researchers Jennifer Robson and Lindsay M. Tedds argue the regulations must consider the intersections of gender, and the nature and severity of the disability. They also say the process must include substantive involvement of the disability community â not simply consultation.Â
Along with housing, food prices have topped cost-of-living concerns in recent months. In the 2023 budget, Ottawa announced a one-time grocery rebate that provided $2.5 billion in targeted inflation relief to 11 million low- and modest-income Canadians. The rebate was delivered July 5 with the quarterly GST/HST credit payment. Â
However, the one-time grocery rebate was not enough. An analysis shows that the GST credit was too small to lift many above the poverty line. Â
Federal efforts to lower costs and increase income will provide much-needed relief for low-income Canadians and other vulnerable populations. Still, more action is needed and wrestling inflation down wonât be enough.Â
The federal government needs to make sustained improvements to new and existing social supports, and expand targeted benefits for those most vulnerable. Moving forward with EI reform and closing gaps in income supports for the lowest-income Canadians are two areas for increased federal action in the next budget.Â
As the federal government prepares to unveil its 2023 budget, and especially its response to the hundreds of billions of dollars the U.S. government has committed to addressing climate change, it should remember that Canadaâs best chance of economic and emission-reduction success rests with the private sector.
The government has without doubt an important enabling role to play in driving low-carbon investment, but that role is to address market failures. It is not to supplant the role of businesses in choosing which sectors and technologies to invest in.
âIndustrial strategyâ is once again a term heard in corridors of power, although it is now preceded with the adjective âgreen.â Governments do need to think strategically about ensuring that Canada maintains economic growth and competitiveness through the global energy transition. In doing so, governments may be tempted to develop detailed plans for economic activity where they see opportunities, such as the production of green hydrogen or sustainable aviation fuels or batteries for electric vehicles.
But businesses, when risking their own money and jobs, are much better placed to make these risky bets.
At the same time, we need to recognize that markets do not always produce optimal outcomes from a societal perspective, and government policy needs to address those market failures. Doing so will reduce obstacles for the massive investments we need to achieve a prosperous low-carbon future. We see three main sources of market failure for the energy transition: insufficient pricing of the societal costs associated with energy production and use; global and domestic policy and market uncertainty; and risks associated with the development of beneficial new technologies.
Left to their own devices, markets do not account for the climate or environmental damages that result from economic activities. Government policy, through carbon pricing and regulations, can correct this. The U.S. is relying on tax credits and expensive subsidies to drive low-emissions investment. In contrast, Canada has adopted carbon pricing across the country, and the federal benchmark carbon price is scheduled to rise significantly over the next decade. This will increase economic incentives to reduce emissions and develop low-emissions technologies. Canada should focus on improving its pricing and regulatory foundation, and only turn to subsidies and tax credits to address those areas where carbon pricing is ineffective.
The second type of market failure comes from the enormous amount of policy and market uncertainty facing companies and investors. Policy reversals can be very costly for business, and few governments are able to provide credible long-term trajectories for their policies.
Of course, markets can also be fickle: shifts in technologies and consumer demand or the entrance of new competitors can wipe out returns. These uncertainties act as a barrier to investment. Governments can reduce this uncertainty through policies such as âcontracts for differenceâ that compensate companies if policies or carbon price trajectories change. If the federal governmentâs proposed $15 billion Canada Growth Fund focuses on addressing these kinds of investment risks, it will be a worthy policy experiment.
The third kind of market failure stems from the technology risk associated with the commercial-scale deployment of many early-stage emissions-reducing technologies, which require huge up-front capital investments and then many years to realize an investment return. However, many of these projects will generate societal benefits by reducing technology risk for similar future projects. Governments can play a role in overcoming barriers to investment in early-stage projects by sharing some of the risk with investors, and potentially some of the financial benefits too. The U.S. has taken the approach of generous production tax credits for emerging products such as green hydrogen and sustainable aviation fuels, which could pull investment away from Canadian projects. Maintaining a competitive edge without breaking the bank will be one of the defining challenges of Canadaâs upcoming budget.
In implementing these policies, governments should see their role as an enabler of private-sector success. If they take an overly top-down or government-knows-best approach, public spending could crowd out private investment and Canada could be left with costly white elephants or an endless demand for subsidies to prop up unsuccessful ventures. There has been insufficient research on enabling policy tools to date, and governments could benefit from a more rigorous external analysis of various approaches.
The coming energy transition will be complicated and full of uncertainty. Governments should resist the siren song for direct involvement in the direction of specific sectors or technologies, and focus instead on addressing the market failures that are obstacles for low-emissions investment. Once those broad direction-setting policies are in place, the private sector will have all the market signals it needs to get us to the cleaner future we all want.
*****
Christopher Ragan is an economist and Director of the Max Bell School of Public Policy at McGill University. Rachel Samson is Vice President of Research at the Institute for Research on Public Policy
This op-ed was first published by The Hill Times on March 22, 2023
Now that the summer is wrapping up, many Canadian adults are in âback-to-schoolâ mode regarding their children. But what about the parents themselves? Todayâs economic and social reality means many of them would also benefit from increased learning opportunities, whether itâs how to negotiate a contract, improve their reading to help their children with homework, or upgrade their skills to get a better job.
In Canada, adult education provides life-changing opportunities for millions. Yet it remains a forgotten corner of education, lacking co-ordination and sharing of best practices; its learners and teachers often stigmatized; and its programs underfunded, and disconnected from social policy and education at large.
In a paper published by the Institute for Research on Public Policy on UNESCOâs International Literacy Day, I offer insights from Aotearoa New Zealand, a country that set up an overarching national educational strategy that helped move adult education from the margins to the mainstream. (Aotearoa, the MÄori word for New Zealand, is increasingly used interchangeably there.) I also review lessons from Canada from the early 1970s to the mid-2000s, reflecting on how we might better support the learning of adults in our geographically vast, diverse and federated nation.
I identify five key areas for action across federal, provincial and territorial governments.
1. Make adult education mainstream
New Zealandâs most important step was to group everything involving the education of adults under one banner, from adult literacy to vocational training to higher education, and then to connect it to various ministries and agencies responsible for social and economic policies. Canada has had many champions, organizations and initiatives to be proud of, which helped place adult education on the radar of our governments and citizens over the 1970s, 80s and 90s. While many of these initiatives and institutions folded from 2000 to 2010, Canada can learn both from its past experience and from New Zealand to help bring adult education more into the mainstream, particularly at the provincial and territorial levels.
2. Beware of reliance on single measures of progress
While the proliferation of various literacy assessments, such as the OECDâs International Adult Literacy Survey, helped motivate investments in adult education, their findings should not be used too literally and in isolation. For example, making funding for adult education conditional on outcomes in Canada led to focusing on bringing learners with intermediate literacy skills (level 2) to a so-called âminimum job standardâ (level 3), while overlooking individuals at rudimentary levels 0 or 1 in real need of improvement. Consideration should also be given to assessing âsoftâ outcomes such as changes in personal and social well-being and interest in further learning.
3. Professionalize and recognize adult educators
Increased pay, professional education and certification, and more public recognition of adult educatorsâ contribution to society were the main positive outcomes of New Zealandâs efforts to make adult education mainstream, which also provided greater legitimacy to the entire field. As one adult educator put it, âweâre no longer seen as grannies in cardiesâ referring to the reputation that adult education has had of being a non-serious, voluntary endeavour largely undertaken by retired women. There should always be a space for volunteers and for educators who do not necessarily possess the same credentials.
However, creating new avenues for teacher qualifications and ongoing professional development, as well as paying adult educators well, will help Canada become more of a place that values the education of people of all ages. Similarly, ensuring meaningful inclusion of experienced adult educators in the development of any evaluation tool, accountability requirements, or adult education policy development will also help make sure learners and educators get the support they need.
4. Empower Indigenous leadership in adult education
Aotearoaâs increasingly close work with the MÄori over the past decades â including the development of a MÄori qualifications framework and consideration of non-traditional outcomes, as well as required knowledge of aspects of MÄori culture, history and language for teacher credentials â was an important step forward, and should be of particular interest in Canada at all levels of the government. Partnering with, providing increased financial support to, and empowering the leadership of First Nations, MĂ©tis and Inuit organizations will be crucial.
5. Build toward national co-ordination
Most likely, there will always be 13 separate education systems â for both adults and children â in Canada, so having better communication and co-ordination among them will greatly benefit both learners and teachers. There may be ways to make better use of existing organizations such as the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada that could facilitate the exchange of knowledge and practices across the country; help tackle interprovincial barriers to credential recognition; and generally contribute to streamlining the decentralized field of adult education in Canada. We should also consider reinvesting in pan-Canadian clearing houses to share best practices, along the lines of the former National Adult Literacy Database; supporting work that both captures and shares effective adult education; and exploring possibilities for new ways of supporting and sharing provincial research on Canadian adult learning. Any cross-country initiatives, however, must have provinces and territories as the key players that benefit from these initiatives rather than entities that merely report and contribute.
Canada now appears to be making a renewed effort to build a more robust adult education and skills system. Encouraging signs over the past few years include overall increased budgetary commitments, the Future Skills Centre and the recent establishment of the federal Office of Skills for Success. While these developments give cause for renewed optimism, the adult education field continues to lie outside the mainstream and little seems to have been done to challenge the long-standing association of adult education with basic learning for a small and marginalized subset of the population.
By drawing on lessons from our past and from other countriesâ experiences, we can bring all government and non-government actors together to devise a nationally coherent system of adult education that will create a better future for us all.
Labour markets are in constant flux. As some sectors retract and shed jobs, others grow and search for workers. Weâve seen this play out over the past two years of the pandemic, as workers in the tourism and hospitality sector have been particularly hard hit by business closures while the healthcare sector has struggled to find workers.
The trend is expected to continue as Canada transitions to a low-carbon economy. TD Economics estimates that three-quarters of workers employed in Canadaâs oil and gas sector are at risk of losing their jobs over the next 30 years. Yet many new jobs are expected to be created in clean-energy industries.
Helping workers find new employment options will be vital, and so will the availability of career guidance to help them make the transition. But there are few career-guidance options available for working-age adults in Canada. Research by the Labour Market Information Council shows that few Canadian adults access career services, far fewer than their counterparts in peer countries; many Canadians surveyed didnât know these services even existed.
In a study published by the Institute for Research on Public Policy, we propose a new approach to career planning. Rather than relying on an individualâs degree or diploma or previous job title to look for employment alternatives, the method we employ identifies occupations — perhaps even in a different industry — that overlap with their current or recent job in terms of work activities and competences. This approach broadens the range of new employment options available for jobseekers and should result in a better job match. Our approach only considers alternative jobs in growing industries that offer wages at least as high as what workers earned in their previous occupation.
But identifying alternative careers isnât enough. We can also pinpoint any skills gaps that would need to be addressed to make these transitions successful. This allows individuals and career counsellors to develop a roadmap to identify appropriate training programs that help jobseekers qualify for new jobs. Ideally, our proposed methodology would be used in conjunction with real-time data available on job-posting sites like ZipRecruiter or Indeed, as well as information on training options from tools that donât yet exist but need to be developed.
We hear a lot about skills that workers will need to remain resilient in the face of labour market disruptions. In our view, a one-size-fits-all approach must give way to personalized career and training guidance tools that make the most of an individualâs skills, interests and abilities. Such tools will improve job matches, better target retraining efforts, and increase participation in and completion of training programs.
This type of comprehensive skills-based approach to career guidance would offer tailor-made employment and training solutions for unemployed workers, workers who seek to improve their employment options and those who are in danger of losing their jobs. These tools could be especially helpful for vulnerable populations, such as women and racialized Canadians whose jobs were most affected by the pandemic shutdowns.
When globalization and automation led to a widespread loss of jobs in North Americaâs manufacturing sector in the 1990s, many of the displaced workers took ill-suited jobs, resulting in lower pay and a loss of skills. Letâs avoid repeating mistakes of the past. Adopting a comprehensive skills-based approach to career guidance, like the one we propose, would be a step in the right direction. Our methodology remains in early stages of development and bringing it into widespread use will require substantial government investment. Given the scale of the problem, we canât afford to put it off.
Matthias Oschinski is the founder and CEO of Belongnomics, and a member of the teaching faculty at the University of Torontoâs Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy.
Thanh Nguyen is an undergraduate student in computer science and engineering at MIT.
This op-ed was originally published by The Hill Times.