Trudeau wants to change relations between Ottawa and different levels of government, but the details are hazy.
When it comes to intergovernmental relations, prime ministers seldom end up where they said they would. Realism collides with idealism. It happened to Stephen Harper, and to many prime ministers before him; it may yet happen to Justin Trudeau — or not. It’s a tendency, not predetermination. But Canadians are starting to wonder if recent carbon pricing and health transfer ultimatums are harbingers of a shift in Trudeau’s federalism.
Stephen Harper talked about sweeping change before taking office and then progressively abandoned his project called “open federalism,” which was meant to disentangle the federal and provincial orders of government. Unilateral federal action in many areas of provincial jurisdiction was his response to his exasperation over slow provincial take-up of his vision of small government, balanced budgets and market-enabling federalism.
Trudeau also has a vision for wholesale change in relations among levels of government in Canada. Collaboration is to be the approach with the provinces, consultation with municipalities and nation-to-nation partnerships with Indigenous peoples. But he has provided little detail on what collaboration actually means.
One can understand why Trudeau opted for collaboration early on. Ottawa had slipped in power and prestige, as the provinces took on a leadership role in policy development and implementation in a range of areas. Harper’s tax cuts and deficit reduction programs left little in the public purse for activist governments that followed his.
Confidence in a more assertive federal role gradually overtook Trudeau’s initially modest approach. Public tolerance for deficits had grown in the wake of Harper’s drastic public service reductions. Trudeau as prime minister has accumulated significant national and international political capital. Provincial consensus on climate policies has proved elusive, apparently requiring the federal government to end the impasse.
So, on the one hand, there are grounds to be skeptical about Trudeau’s commitment to collaborative intergovernmentalism. I use the word intergovernmentalism here rather than federalism because Trudeau sees the enlisting of other levels and forms of government (including Indigenous people) as part of his social and economic vision, an implication that might be missed with the narrower term “federalism.”
Sceptics might see a trend in recent moves. Trudeau announced that the provinces have until 2018 to adopt a carbon pricing scheme or Ottawa will impose one. He risked nation-to-nation relations with Indigenous peoples by green-lighting Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain pipeline and the Pacific NorthWest LNG project. Moreover, Ottawa recently dictated the terms of a deal on health care spending. Unilateralism seems the order of the day.
On the other hand, cooperation and bargaining hint at a “collaborative” vision. The complex suite of programs in the 2016 Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change was intergovernmentalism in action. Trudeau has accommodated the needs of provinces for flexibility on pipelines, liquefied natural gas, coal-equivalency agreements and comparative climate indicators. He channelled Indigenous views on rejecting the Northern Gateway pipeline project.
Has Trudeau shifted away from collaborative federalism? Hard to say. Unlike Harper, Trudeau has never enunciated the operational details of his federal vision. His platform and mandate letters are maddeningly vague.
Instead he has offered only partial approaches. One option is a “collaborative consent” model for cooperating with Indigenous peoples (collaborating at multiple stages of the policy process, building consent at each stage, rather than all-or-nothing decisions at the end). Trudeau has also talked about a “medicare model” for climate change, which entails collaboratively setting national standards, then providing targeted federal funding for provincial experimentation.
These are partial outlooks on specific dossiers. They are not a general approach to dealing with other orders of government, at least on the face of it. Governments and civil society do not know what to expect from Ottawa as a public policy partner.
Until we have a fix on what Trudeau means by collaboration, we will have a hard time determining if he has changed or not. It’s time to pin him down. In Canada, the outcome of many important files — climate change action, Indigenous affairs, health care and more — depends on what game plan governments are following.
Christopher Dunn is a professor of political science at Memorial University. He has published widely on constitutionalism, federalism and public policy. He was an invited witness before the Special Committee on Electoral Reform.
Four years ago, at age 84, my dad survived a severe stroke. The downside is that during his hospital stay this otherwise fit person was put on a drug regimen and has been taking nine prescription drugs a day ever since.
My dad’s experience with multiple drugs is not uncommon for his age group. Seniors age 65 and over are the heaviest users of prescription drugs in the country. They take, on average, 7.4 prescription drugs.
Experts have pointed to increased drug utilization as a driver of health care spending in Canada for some years, but safety issues are increasingly salient. Seniors are five times more likely than younger Canadians to be hospitalized as a result of an adverse drug reaction (ADR). In 2011, over 27,000 Canadian seniors — that is, one in 200 — had an ADR-related hospitalization.
Seniors face a higher risk of adverse drug reactions, in part because of physiological changes as we age that alter the way our bodies respond to medication (pharmacokinetics) and process them (pharmacomdynamics). For instance, our kidneys and liver tend to lose functional ability and become less efficient in flushing out drugs.
Many drugs prescribed to seniors have either not been adequately studied for this age group or have not been formally approved for the conditions they are being prescribed to treat. They are sometimes prescribed without any evidence they are safe and effective for them, and in some cases, even when they are known to present a possible risk (antipsychotics prescribed to older patients with dementia, for example).
It is estimated that as much as half of the medications given to seniors are taken incorrectly or are prescribed in an excessive manner.
Clinical trials often exclude not only older people, but also people of all ages who take a combination of medications. On average, two-thirds of seniors take five or more prescriptions drugs over the course of a year — one-quarter take 10 or more. The prevalence of polypharmacy (multiple medications) has been rising from 54.7 percent of seniors using five prescription drugs or more in 2000 to 66.1 percent in 2014.
The dangers of polypharmacy for seniors are seen in doctors’ offices and hospitals. The more medications they consume, the more likely seniors are to require urgent medical attention or go to emergency departments. A study found that 12 percent of Canadian seniors taking five or more medications have experienced an adverse reaction requiring medical attention.
Clearly, we need a solution.
In a new Institute for Research on Public Policy Study (IRPP) study, I have documented several collaborative initiatives undertaken by professionals, advocacy groups and health authorities, which seek to provide information and educational resources, reallocate roles and responsibilities and promote innovation. While they are all valuable, their overall effectiveness is limited, because they address only narrow aspects of a much bigger problem.
Improving drug safety among seniors requires systemic change.
Governments could use legislation and financial instruments to much greater effect to steer the country’s efforts in the right direction. Required is a comprehensive national strategy which involves leadership and engagement from Health Canada, provincial and territorial health ministries and local health authorities.
Building on the 2015 recommendations of the Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, such a strategy would entail revising the drug approval process, monitoring newly marketed drugs prescribed to seniors, improving reporting on adverse drug reactions and encouraging independent research into off-label prescription drug use.
Provincial and territorial pharmacare programs should also be extended to provide broader and more systematic coverage of effective nondrug therapies whenever appropriate, to treat older patients with chronic conditions.
Provinces and territories would be required to update their prescribing guidelines regularly and require medication reviews. Health authorities would need to ensure that professionals have access to clinical decision-making tools, as well as accurate and comprehensive information on patients’ medical histories, in order to improve prescribing practices overall.
Clearly, much more can and should be done by governments to address this serious health issue for our aging population.
Nicole F. Bernier is a researcher and writer on Canadian health and social policy and expert adviser with EvidenceNetwork.ca. She worked from 2011 to 2016 as research director at the Institute for Research on Public Policy and is the author of an IRPP Study entitled, Improving Prescription Drug Safety for Canadian Seniors.
Earlier this year, Saskatchewan Premier Brad Wall asked Ottawa to send back the money it contributed to equalization to help the struggling province through the downturn in energy prices. His remarks point to enduring political frustrations about the functioning of Canada’s current arrangement for territorial financial redistribution, which allocates more than $17-billion a year to provinces falling below the equalization standard.
Simultaneously, Alberta’s Wildrose Party formed a panel in February to examine the impact of equalization payments on the country. Its report, released last week, is highly critical of the program.
Although equalization is not up for a formal review until 2019, we argue in a recent study published by the Institute for Research on Public Policy that its governance structure should be re-examined to ensure it is administered in the fairest and most impartial way as possible.
To reduce the political heat, the federal government should consider the creation of an arm’s-length agency such as the Australian Commonwealth Grants Commission to make recommendations on equalization payments.
Since it was put in place in the early 1930s, the Australian model has contributed to the fairly low level of intergovernmental tensions around equalization in that country. While the strength of provincial governments and identities in Canada might mean a de-politicization of equalization similar to that of Australia will be difficult to reach, attenuating the federal government’s role as the sole arbiter on equalization can help us move in the right direction. In fact, such a reform would require Ottawa to loosen its reins on equalization and force the provinces to give up their federal whipping horse.
An arm’s-length agency administering equalization in Canada would receive its terms of reference from the federal government. After receiving input from the provincial governments, it would make a recommendation on equalization payments to the federal government, which would make the final decision. The arm’s-length agency would also make recommendations on adjustments to the formula and the program more generally. The agency could be headed by non-partisan, well-respected experts, preferably with links to different regions of the country, serving as commissioners. In Australia, the number of equalization commissioners is set at three and Canada could adopt this model or increase their number to five, with the aim of increasing the expertise level of the new arm’s-length agency. At the same time, like in Australia, commissioners would rely on the administrative and technical support of highly qualified staff hired directly by the agency using a merit system.
The creation of Canada’s equalization program in 1957 represented a milestone, not only because it established mechanisms to reduce disparities among the 10 provinces, but also because it would embed equalization in broader notions of solidarity and nationhood. The current governance arrangement may give citizens the impression that equalization is subject to the political vagaries of the federation and allows the program to be painted by some as a rigged welfare scheme, which is a complete distortion. Adopting governance structures that work to remove this impression of overt politicization of equalization could strengthen the program in the short and long term.
A new federal government that has signalled its willingness to develop a new type of relationship with the provinces might provide an opportunity to restructure how equalization is administered. Now that intergovernmental relations around equalization are quiet, this would be a good time to consider reform options that could help avoid the type of bickering that occurred during the Paul Martin and early Stephen Harper years.
Daniel Béland is the Canada Research Chair in Public Policy and a professor at the Johnson Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy at University of Saskatchewan. André Lecours is a professor at the School of Political Studies at University of Ottawa.
More than 400,000 working age adults with physical or mental disabilities are currently unemployed in Canada, despite being willing and able to participate in the labour force.
Strong federal leadership and intergovernmental co-operation are needed to ensure that more Canadians with disabilities have access to real work for real pay, and that their rights are protected by labour legislation and safety standards equal to that of other workers.
Many aspects of social policy were highlighted in the 2016 federal budget, but people with disabilities were not.
The federal contribution to the Labour Market Agreement for Persons with Disabilities (LMAPDs) has declined in real terms over the past decade.
For years, existing agreements have been renewed one year at a time, which undercuts long-term planning. To substantially improve labour-force participation of people with disabilities, larger federal transfers are essential. A case can be made for using the federal spending power in a purposeful and focused manner for these forgotten 400,000.
A new national policy framework should help enable people with disabilities to attain postsecondary education, to participate in training and vocational rehabilitation and to obtain and hold gainful employment in inclusive workplaces, on an equal basis with other people.
Greater attention is needed on workplace practices and the role of disability management, bolstered by federal investments through intergovernmental agreements, grants and tax measures.
In a recent study published by the Institute for Research on Public Policy, I propose a sixpoint action plan for both orders of government: (1) Renew the Canadian vision on disability and citizenship; (2) improve transition planning for youths with disabilities; (3) expand postsecondary education; (4) foster improvement in workplace practices; (5) enhance employment services and supports; and (6) modernize labour market agreements.
It’s time to develop a new generation of LMAPDs, by investing in targeted areas.
Ottawa could offer to share the cost of provincial programs that offer students with disabilities co-operative placements, work terms, summer jobs in the private sector or in social enterprises with inclusive work settings.
Enhancing the array of employment services should not mean simply filling in gaps by adding resources to the existing ones delivered.
A more basic requirement is to modernize the range of services available. This means re-examining community-based day programs, facility-based day activities attached to residential facilities, sheltered workshops and similar segregated forms of employment.
The Council of Ministers of Education must identify students with disabilities and postsecondary education as a new priority.
Ministers should focus on students’ transitions from secondary schools to postsecondary institutions; make financial assistance available to students with disabilities; and examine best practices on reasonable accommodation and inclusive education at colleges and universities.
The Canada Social Transfer should address the learning needs and opportunities of people with disabilities. In education and employment, Canadians with disabilities are among the most disadvantaged citizens relative to the general population.
Therefore, the equity aim would be to increase the number of men and women with physical and mental disabilities who participate in postsecondary education.
To promote meaningful selfemployment and business development, the federal government should consider extending the Entrepreneurs with Disabilities Program beyond its current scope of Western Canada.
Renewed federal leadership can provide provinces and territories with some flexibility to tailor programs to local circumstances.
It is equally important that the federal government promote real employment and fostercompliance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
Michael J. Prince is Lansdowne Professor of social policy at the University of Victoria.
In its inaugural budget, the federal Liberal government vowed to develop a bold, new innovation agenda as the centrepiece of its strategy to bolster long-term economic growth. This was the right call, not only because it plays well—who would disagree with Canada becoming “a centre of global innovation?”—but also because innovation-driven productivity growth is unequivocally essential for our future prosperity.
My recent paper on the subject, published by the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP), explains why this is so. Quite simply, Canada can no longer rely heavily on previous sources of growth—like a trade boost after signing onto NAFTA or a commodity-price boom—that have masked its innovation problem.
That leaves us with improving productivity—working smarter. Productivity figures can be disaggregated into three components: workforce quality; capital deepening; and what economists call multi-factor productivity, essentially the know-how in combining labour and capital, i.e. innovation. Compared to the U.S., Canada has done relatively well in recent years on the first two elements, but dismally on the last. In fact, innovation-driven productivity improvement has made virtually no contribution to Canada’s growth since 2000.
How can Canada turn this around? For many years the mantra has been to increase business research and development (R&D). However, despite generous tax credits and a myriad of direct funding programs, business R&D as a share of GDP has fallen since peaking in 2000. There is no reason to believe that more of the same will get us from here to there.
The answer to a turnaround lies in a better understanding of what motivates business decisions. The Council of Canadian Academies concluded in a 2013 study, that “Canadian firms have been as innovative as they have needed to be,” doing business in “a low-innovation equilibrium.” A lack of competitive pressure in many key sectors of the Canadian economy has provided the basis for this seemingly rational response.
Business profits as a share of GDP have been higher in Canada than the United States over the last three decades—suggesting that many Canadian companies have until now done relatively well without innovating.
Today, the key questions are: Will Canadian businesses respond to the urgent need to focus on innovation-based strategies? And what can public policy do to facilitate the transition?
Building on the 2011 Jenkins Report on innovation, my paper makes three broad recommendations.
First, systematically review trade, investment and regulatory policies that have served to inhibit competition in Canada and reinforce the low-innovation equilibrium. For example, ownership restrictions in key sectors like telecommunications and airlines inhibit competition in those sectors and increase the cost of doing business in Canada.
Second, emphasize demand-side instruments such as smart regulation and government procurement that can be designed to incentivize innovative responses, while protecting the broader public interest. For example, going beyond the current token effort at stimulating business innovation through creative government procurement contracting, like the U.S. and other countries, would allow Canadian companies to develop new products and processes for global markets.
Third, rebalance supply-side instruments by de-emphasizing business R&D support relative to other key elements, such as enhancing workplace skills, de-risking growth financing, and reinforcing innovation ecosystems involving sectoral and regional clusters. Building on pilot initiatives in each of these areas into full-blown programs would help high-growth firms scale-up more rapidly and increase the probability of remaining based in Canada.
By following this approach we would broaden innovation policy from a longstanding, almost singular, focus on R&D to a more challenging, but more rewarding, multi-faceted micro-economic agenda. It’s more challenging because various interests would resist changes to the status quo, but it will be more rewarding because that will be what it takes to make Canada a centre of global innovation.
Andrei Sulzenko is a former senior assistant deputy minister of policy at Industry Canada. He is the author of Canada’s Innovation Conundrum: Five Years after the Jenkins Report, published by the Institute for Research on Public Policy (irpp.org).
Rebecca’s days used to start well before sunrise. Every working day, she would wake up at 3 a.m. to make sure her chronically ill husband’s care needs would be met throughout the day — a busy job in itself, one that was well under way by the time her paid job began at 6 a.m. Her shifts were long: she worked until 7 p.m., or sometimes even later, all the time monitoring her husband at home. Then the full cycle would start again the next day — until she burned out.
Rebecca is just one of more than 8 million Canadians who demonstrate that they care about family and friends by caring for them when their health fails. More than 13 million of us will do so during our lifetimes. Indeed the vast majority of care Canadians receive comes from family and friends. And thanks to population aging, rising rates of disability, profound changes in Canadian families and escalating pressures on the health and continuing care sector, the odds of becoming a caregiver are high and will likely grow in the years ahead.
Of course we have always cared for one another. It’s what families, friends and neighbours do. It’s what I did during my parents’ last years, and it’s what almost everyone I know has been, is, or expects to be doing. The difference now is that the demand for care is threatening to outstrip families’ capacity to continue meeting the demand. Families are smaller, more geographically separated and, thanks to higher rates of divorce and remarriage, relationships are more ambiguous.
Most of us are employed full time. Caregivers now comprise a third of the Canadian workforce. And it’s taking a toll. Caregiving carries with it risks of injury and poor health, social exclusion, and economic hardship for the caregiver. Caregiving costs spill over onto employers: care-related turnover, absenteeism and “presenteeism” affect their bottom line. And caregiver burnout means that both caregivers and the persons they’re caring for may draw more heavily on health and continuing care services.
I was lucky. I had a job that paid well, had good benefits, and, with the exception of having to be in the classroom at specific times, gave me enough control and flexibility that I could fit my caregiving responsibilities around my job for the most part. I also was lucky that my father was a veteran and, in those days, Veterans Affairs Canada did well by veterans in need. That said, since my parents lived a province away, a monthly caregiving visit averaged at least $700 in out-of-pocket commuting costs. Others are much less fortunate though.
We can no longer afford to treat family care as essentially free labour, undertaken by and within families as a private matter with no relevance for the rest of society. Family members and friends provide 10 times as many hours of care as paid caregivers do. By my last calculation, that care work is worth more than $66 billion. Society can’t afford to ignore threats to sustainability of this vast care sector.
Opposition to public support for family care is driven by fear that families will abandon their natural obligations and contribute further to what some contend is the modern day “downfall of the family.” But the evidence simply doesn’t support this fear. In fact public supports rarely displace family care, rather they complement it, even extending families’ caring capacity and reducing the risk of institutionalization of the person in need of care.
A recent study published by the Institute for Research and Public Policy outlines four pillars for a comprehensive caregiver policy strategy: we need to recognize the value of family caregivers’ work and their right to “have a life”; ensure that there are adequate, accessible and affordable services for care receivers and caregivers; organize workplaces and labour policy so that caregivers can keep earning a living alongside their care work as long as possible; and when caregiving still results in financial hardship for some, we need to be ready with anti-poverty measures.
Caregivers and care work is an essential component of family, community and our national well-being. As our population ages, disability rates continue to increase and our health and continuing care sectors continue to face growing pressures, it will be essential that we understand, recognize and support caregivers and their work.
Janet Fast is a professor in the Department of Human Ecology at the University of Alberta. She is the author of Caregiving for Older Adults with Disabilities: Present Costs, Future Challenges, published by the Institute for Research on Public Policy.
The new Liberal government will consult with Canadians regarding our involvement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) — the 12-country trade deal that was recently announced. International Trade Minister Chrystia Freeland indicated this review will include the $4.3 billion package that the previous government promised to supply-managed sectors (the dairy, chicken, turkey, egg and hatching egg industries) as compensation for TPP.
These consultations are a welcome development as Canada looks to potentially implement major trade deals — not only TPP, but also an earlier agreement with the European Union (CETA). Taking the opportunity to rethink whether to offer government compensation, and if so, how best to do it, is a worthwhile exercise.
While trade liberalization offers long-term economic benefits, trade deals can entail difficult adjustments for some firms and workers. To aid the transition, some countries — including the United States — offer dedicated trade adjustment assistance (TAA) programs to affected workers or firms. These programs typically provide workers with temporary income support and retraining subsidies.
In our new study for the Institute for Research on Public Policy, we trace the history of TAA in Canada and examine recent compensation packages offered in TPP and CETA, which we view as an ad hoc form of trade adjustment assistance.
Focusing on Canada’s TPP-related program for supply-managed sectors, there are three main components that seek to address potential negative impacts of greater imports. First, a $2.4 billion Income Guarantee Program will ensure producer incomes do not fall for at least 10 years after TPP comes into force. Second, a $1.5 billion Quota Value Guarantee Program protects producers against any declines in their quota values over the next decade. Finally, the former government promised a $450 million Processor Modernization Fund to support new investment by firms as well as spending on technical and management capacity in the sector.
We offer three observations on these programs. First, the Income Guarantee Program is an entirely new development in the history of Canada’s TAA. Unlike any prior program, producers in supply-managed sectors would be guaranteed that their incomes will not decline as a result of a trade deal. Previous programs offered income support, but nothing close to a guarantee against lower income.
Second, the ad hoc nature of these programs implies quite different and potentially inequitable treatment of firms and workers in various sectors. For instance, compare the funds promised to dairy and poultry processors in TPP to those offered to Newfoundland and Labrador’s fish processors in CETA negotiations. As far as we know, there are no conditions attached to the fund for supply-managed sectors but “demonstrable harm” would be required to obtain up to $280 million in support in the fisheries industry.
These programs are inequitable in another way. According to Statistics Canada’s 2011 Farm Financial Survey, the average net worth of a Canadian dairy farmer was $2.7 million, with an average annual net cash farm income of over $120,000. Workers outside of supply-managed sectors who are negatively affected by the TPP and CETA agreements won’t receive an income guarantee. Instead, they will have only our unemployment insurance system to fall back on, a system that has been weakened in past decades.
Third, assistance for supply-managed sectors is unlikely to improve their viability and may instead stifle incentives for the sector to change. Even though the Modernization Fund could help processors become more efficient, the continued regulation of supply and prices in the sector will likely result in ineffective use of the funds. In similar American and Korean programs, firms used the funds for purposes other than “modernization.”
Our negative view of these programs echoes that of the 1980s Macdonald Commission concerning the Canadian TAA programs of the 1970s — which was that they were designed “in large measure, to postpone, rather than to facilitate, adjustment.”
Overall, the TAA programs announced for supply-managed sectors fall short in terms of both economic efficiency and equity. The income and quota value guarantees are unprecedented, expensive, and seem destined to impede rather than facilitate economic adjustment. Moreover, they are unfair to workers and firms in other sectors affected by TPP, as well as those affected by economic developments other than trade agreements. Such ad hoc assistance is better understood as a political strategy used by the previous government to mitigate opposition to trade liberalization by a specific group, rather than as a serious effort to aid economic adjustment and minimize social consequences.
A better way forward for the new Liberal government is to adopt a more modern and comprehensive set of labour adjustment programs. The ultimate goal should be to help workers adjust to important longer-term structural changes in the labour market — whether caused by specific trade agreements, technological change or other factors.
Dmitry Lysenko is a senior policy analyst with the government of Nova Scotia. Saul Schwartz is a Professor in the School of Public Policy and Administration at Carleton University.
Lors de la récente élection fédérale, un nombre record de 47 députés issus de minorités visibles ont été élus, ce qui représente une augmentation de 9 % à 14 % depuis les élections de 2011. Et bien que cette proportion reste encore en deçà des 19 % de la population de minorités visibles au Canada, le résultat constitue un bond majeur dans leur représentation politique à Ottawa. Il nous amène à nous questionner sur l’influence de ce segment de la population, toujours en pleine croissance, sur les dynamiques politiques au sein de la fédération canadienne.
À l’heure actuelle, la presque totalité des membres des minorités visibles (96,5 %) est née à l’extérieur du Canada ou née au Canada de parents immigrés. Cette population étant aussi plus jeune que la moyenne canadienne, une forte proportion parmi elle n’a pas vécu les nombreuses querelles constitutionnelles, de la commission royale d’enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme en 1963 au référendum de 1995.
Notre étude intitulée Seeing the Same Canada? Visible Minorities’ Views of the Federation, que vient de publier l’Institut de recherche en politiques publiques, explore les attitudes de ces personnes à l’égard du fonctionnement de la fédération canadienne. Nous nous sommes posé les questions suivantes : les membres des minorités visibles ont-ils la même vision des dynamiques fédérales-provinciales qui ont marqué l’histoire politique canadienne que la population majoritaire de leur province de résidence ? Embrassent-ils les revendications régionales historiques des provinces où ils vivent, ou expriment-ils un plus grand sentiment de loyauté envers le gouvernement fédéral et les institutions centrales ?
Bien que les relations entre le Québec et le Canada aient été au cœur des conflits ayant trait à la vision de la fédération canadienne, d’autres provinces – tout particulièrement celles de l‘Ouest – ont aussi exprimé de nombreux désaccords au cours de leur histoire quant au fonctionnement des institutions fédérales. Notre étude examine les attitudes des minorités visibles à cet égard au Québec, en Ontario, en Alberta et en Colombie-Britannique, en comparant trois groupes : les membres des minorités visibles qui sont nés à l’extérieur du Canada, ceux qui sont nés ici et, enfin, la population majoritaire (c’est-à-dire les personnes qui sont nées au Canada mais n’appartiennent pas à une minorité visible).
L’étude est fondée sur les données du Projet sur la diversité provinciale, un sondage réalisé en hiver 2014 auprès de 10 000 répondants. Nous explorons quatre dimensions des dynamiques fédérales-provinciales, soit le sentiment identitaire à l’égard du Canada et de la province de résidence, les conflits régionaux, les relations avec les institutions politiques fédérales et provinciales, et les politiques pancanadiennes (bilinguisme, multiculturalisme, péréquation).
En ce qui concerne les griefs à caractère régional, notre étude fait état de différences de perception importantes entre les personnes nées à l’extérieur du Canada et la population majoritaire dans trois des quatre provinces, l’Ontario constituant l’exception. Dans la mesure où ces revendications sont moins prononcées en Ontario, le résultat n’est pas surprenant. En Alberta et en Colombie-Britannique, les membres des minorités visibles nés à l’étranger n’expriment pas avec la même force que la population majoritaire ces griefs à l’égard du fonctionnement de la fédération. Mais pour ce qui est des autres dimensions examinées, les personnes nées à l’étranger affichent des attitudes généralement semblables à celles du reste de la population. De plus, les membres des minorités visibles nés au Canada dans ces deux provinces ont une vision de la fédération canadienne généralement identique à celle de la population majoritaire. Notre étude démontre donc qu’en Ontario, en Alberta et en Colombie-Britannique, la croissance rapide de la population de minorités visibles est peu susceptible de mener à long terme à une transformation radicale de la culture politique en matière de fédéralisme et de politiques pancanadiennes.
La réalité québécoise est tout autre. Pour ce qui est de la quasi-totalité des dimensions examinées, nous observons que les membres des minorités visibles sont davantage orientés vers le fédéral que la population majoritaire. De plus, il n’y a pas de différences entre les personnes nées au Canada et celles nées à l’étranger, qu’il s’agisse de leur attachement au Canada et à la province, des griefs à l’égard du fonctionnement de la fédération, de la confiance envers les institutions ou de l’appui aux politiques fédérales. La situation au Québec est donc unique en raison du nombre de clivages entre les minorités visibles et la population majoritaire, de l’ampleur de ces clivages et de leur présence autant chez les membres des minorités visibles nés à l’étranger que ceux nés au pays – ce qui n’est pas le cas dans les deux provinces de l’Ouest.
La réalité québécoise révèle aussi un important clivage linguistique. Ainsi, les membres des minorités visibles qui parlent une autre langue que le français à la maison adhèrent beaucoup plus fortement à une vision nationale du Canada que la population majoritaire, et ils soutiennent cette vision bien davantage que les membres des minorités visibles qui parlent français à la maison. Ces données montrent l’importance que revêt l’intégration linguistique dans le processus de socialisation politique au Québec.
Les Canadiens soucieux de l’unité nationale se réjouiront sans doute des résultats de notre étude, qui indiquent un sentiment de loyauté plus fort à l’égard de la fédération chez les minorités visibles au Québec. On peut cependant se demander quelle sera l’incidence de telles différences sur le climat social et politique au Québec. À ce chapitre, notre étude fournit des arguments à ceux qui considèrent que le Québec doit absolument se doter d’une véritable politique de l’interculturalisme afin de favoriser le rapprochement entre la population majoritaire et les minorités ethnoculturelles.
Une dernière différence importante s’observe partout au Canada entre les membres des minorités visibles, qu’ils soient nés à l’étranger ou au Canada, et la population majoritaire. Dans toutes les provinces, ceux-ci sont beaucoup plus susceptibles d’approuver la politique canadienne de multiculturalisme. Ainsi la croissance de ce segment de la population au Canada viendrait consolider l’appui à cette politique du gouvernement fédéral, qui s’impose de plus en plus, pour de nombreux Canadiens et Canadiennes, comme un pilier de l’identité canadienne.
Antoine Bilodeau est professeur agrégé de science politique à l’Université Concordia. Luc Turgeon est professeur agrégé à l’École d’études politiques de l’Université d’Ottawa. Stephen E. White est professeur adjoint de science politique à l’Université Carleton. Ailsa Henderson est professeure de science politique à l’Université d’Edinburgh. Ce texte a paru dans Options politiques, le 26 novembre 2015.
Over the past five years, provincial governments from coast to coast have introduced higher-rate income tax brackets for top earners. Now, with the election of the Liberals in Ottawa, the federal government will follow the path set forth by the provinces, with a plan to increase the top federal income tax rate to 33 per cent from 29 per cent for income over $200,000. What is the appropriate role for provincial and federal governments in taxing high earners, and how should provinces react to this proposed federal initiative? We think there’s a strong argument for federal action replacing provincial initiatives on high income taxation.
Our recent paper for the Institute for Research on Public Policy looks in depth at provincial taxation of high incomes. British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador and most recently Alberta have added tax brackets aimed specifically at high earners. In most cases, the new rates are only a couple of percentage points higher, but these provincial moves are still noteworthy because they have reversed a two-decade trend of lowering income taxes at both the federal and provincial level.
Our research reveals two main facts about provincial taxation of high earners.
First, higher rates at the provincial level trigger a fairly strong response among high earners – some income gets shifted out of the tax-raising province, which reduces the amount of revenue the new tax ends up generating. This income shifting can happen through accounting and financial strategies, such as setting up a trust in another, lower-taxed province.
Second, the differing circumstances of each province matter. If taxes are already high in a particular province, a further increase will yield less than it would in a province with lower rates. Also, provinces where income is more highly concentrated among high earners have a better chance of raising revenue than those with fewer high earners.
Our findings point to an important tradeoff. Provincial governments can react to local preferences for taxing high earners and also to how many high earners there are. But, provinces acting on their own can lead to some flight of taxable income away from the higher-taxing provinces toward the lower-taxing ones. Without federal involvement, provinces must find a way to balance these pressures.
Federal action changes the calculations. Because a new top tax bracket at the federal level will be the same no matter what province you live in, taxes can no longer be avoided by shifting income across provincial borders. This fact is the main argument in the efficiency case for federal action instead of provincial initiatives on high-income tax progressivity – the idea that those with higher incomes are taxed at progressively higher rates. In addition, the nine provinces (outside Quebec) that rely on the Canada Revenue Agency to collect their income tax have no control over tax administration. In contrast, the federal government can co-ordinate tougher measures against tax avoidance with the new tax policy, increasing its effectiveness.
Several factors have changed since we performed our analysis. A number of court rulings have reinterpreted the provincial residency of trusts, making it a bit harder to shift income out of a high-tax province using a trust. In addition, Alberta’s introduction of a new 15-per-cent tax bracket for high earners has narrowed the tax gap between low-tax Alberta and other provinces.
The provinces should reassess their high-income tax brackets on two fronts.
First, each province will need to decide whether their citizens will view the enhanced progressivity of the federal rate schedule as a sufficient adjustment for high earners, or whether higher provincial rates remain necessary.
Second is the question of revenue. Whether the new provincial high-income brackets are bringing in much revenue is an open question, given the potential for interprovincial revenue shifting. Provinces will need to look carefully at the actual revenue they can expect from their high-income tax brackets in light of the upcoming federal move in that direction.
Income taxation is just one of many areas of federal-provincial interaction that will keep our first ministers busy over the next year. Items ranging from action on climate change to infrastructure, pensions and health care will be up for negotiation and will involve tradeoffs between different orders of government. In all of these files, our federation can be improved if attention is kept firmly on what level of government is best placed to address a given problem. When it comes to taxing high earners, it just might be the case that federal action supplanting previous provincial measures is the right way forward.
Kevin Milligan and Michael Smart are authors of Provincial Taxation of High Incomes: The Effects on Progressivity and Tax Revenue, a chapter from the forthcoming book Income Inequality: The Canadian Story, published by the Institute for Research on Public Policy.
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and China’s President Xi Jinping met for the first time at the G20 Summit on the weekend. Before the end of the month, they will meet again at the APEC summit and at the UN Climate Change Conference.
While Pierre Trudeau had extensive Chinese experience before assuming office in 1968, our new Prime Minister does not. And the Chinese have no experience of him.
China was not mentioned in the Liberal election platform or in the Leaders’ foreign policy debate. But it should be no surprise that a fresh wind will be blowing in bilateral relations. After a decade of inconsistent, conflicted and incremental policies of the Stephen Harper government the time has come for creative thinking, a more strategic approach and national leadership.
The timing is good. In September, Mr. Xi’s U.S. visit symbolized China’s role as a peer, highlighted cooperation on climate change but resolved few of the difficulties in Sino-American relations. Australia is ratifying a free-trade agreement with Beijing.
Britain and China embarked on a new “global comprehensive strategic partnership” amidst the pomp and splendour of a majestic state visit to Britain. The Queen spoke of a “truly global partnership” and their joint roles as “stewards of the rules-based international system.” The David Cameron government clinched a series of trade and investment deals that are part of a longer economic game. Earlier in the year the British government broke ranks with the G7 to sign up for Beijing’s Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank.
The British shift reflects a new calculation about the changing balance of power in Asia and realpolitik thinking in which no country is an eternal ally or a perpetual enemy. London’s special relationship with the United States continues, even though the timing of the shift with China coincides with deepening China-U.S. tensions in cyber space and the South China Sea.
As much as a new Canadian approach to China is needed it would be a mistake to believe that the clock can be wound back to the engagement approach of earlier Canadian governments or that we can simply emulate the British government’s shift marked by a singularly economic focus. Canada needs an entirely new approach to China, based on a three-pronged strategy.
First, Canada should adopt a collaborative approach to our complementary economic interests: Canada has what China needs for energy, natural resources and food security and services for its growing middle class. Twinning energy and environment could be a signature feature. Australians will out-compete us unless we move on a bilateral free-trade agreement.
Secondly, Canada should play a proactive middle-power role in the Asia-Pacific region by deepening our partnerships with Australia’s new Prime Minister, Indonesia and South Korea. We should begin with a defence and security review and active assistance for institution building and rules needed to manage the strategic rebalancing underway.
Finally, we must protect and support Canadian values while finding ways to help build Chinese capabilities consistent with the evolving legal system and building on valued Canadian contribution in the past in education and two-way flows of people.
This strategy demands a new kind of leadership that informs Canadians of the importance of the relationship and coordinates a whole-of-country approach while consolidating high-level dialogues with the Chinese leadership.
Mr. Trudeau will face the challenge in Canada of addressing public anxieties about deeper bilateral engagement. Worries about differing business and regulatory practices, behaviour of about state owned enterprises and purchases of urban real estate imply the need for an informed national conversation about realizing the opportunities and managing the risks.
Canadians need a new narrative of engagement. The existing argument of assisting economic opening and promoting China’s involvement in international institutions as ways to speed political liberalization has been not been borne out – at least not yet. The reality is that we must learn to live with China as it is while standing up for our own values and institutions.
A new whole-of-country approach to Canada’s China policy will require time to implement. But in the coming month our new Prime Minister has the opportunity to strike a constructive and imaginative tone for what will follow.
Wendy Dobson is Professor at the Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto, and Paul Evans teaches Asian and Transpacific Relations at the University of British Columbia. They are the co-authors of ‘The Future of Canada’s Relationship with China’, published by the Institute for Research on Public Policy.
