In this volume, leading scholars have explored two broad policy agendas generated by ethnic diversity in Canada and other Western countries. The first agenda is the multicultural agenda, which seeks to recognize cultural differences, to help minorities express their distinct identities and practices, and to build more accommodating conceptions of citizenship. The second agenda focuses on integration, seeking to bring minorities into the mainstream, strengthen the sense of mutual support and solidarity, and reinforce the bonds of a common community.

Most Western countries have pursued both agendas, to a greater or lesser degree, in recent decades. There is nothing inherently contradictory in the two agendas. Indeed, research by psychologists concludes that the most successful forms of immigrant integration occur when newcomers retain a sense of their heritage culture and seek involvement in the larger society, suggesting that governments should encourage both forms of community (Berry et al. 2006). In contemporary debates, however, many countries are shifting to a heavier emphasis on integration. This pattern is particularly marked in Europe, as the chapters by Christian Joppke and Randall Hansen highlight. Many Europeans fear that multiculturalism has bred separateness and cultural alienation, including among some children of immigrants born and raised in the West. In the United Kingdom, for example, Trevor Phillips, the head of the Commission for Racial Equality and himself a Black Briton, has warned that Britain is in danger of “sleep-walking into segregation” (T. Phillips 2005), and in France riots in major cities have illuminated the geographic, economic and social distance between minorities and the wider society. The common response has been to insist on higher levels of integration. The British prime minister recently proclaimed a “duty to
integrate” (Blair 2006), and some European countries have gone further, occasionally adopting relatively illiberal policies to advance an integrationist agenda.

Recent debates in Canada have not shifted as dramatically. Nevertheless, stress points are appearing, and a number of the chapters in this volume sound warning signals. It is an appropriate time to stand back and take stock. How well is Canada succeeding on the twin agendas of recognition and integration? Do we recognize and support diversity as much as our self-congratulatory pronouncements often suggest? Do we face deepening ethnic divisions that weaken our capacity for collective action and threaten our social cohesion? If there are problems around the corner, what should we do?

This chapter explores these questions, drawing on the evidence presented in this volume and elsewhere. The first section starts by discussing the ways in which Canadians have traditionally approached recognition and integration, focusing in particular on the concept of shared citizenship. The following two sections take stock of the current state of diversity in Canada, asking whether the norms and expectations implicit in the concept of shared citizenship are being realized in practice: section 2 focuses on the multicultural agenda and section 3 turns to integration. The fourth section examines three priorities that flow from the stock-taking and policy issues implicit in these priorities.

Recognition, Belonging and Shared Citizenship: Canadian Approaches

Canadian approaches to diversity naturally reflect Canadian realities. The starting point is that Canada is one of the most multicultural countries in the world. Among OECD countries, it is virtually unique in the coexistence of three dimensions of difference: the historic divide between English- and French-speaking communities, which represents the central reality of Canadian political life; the presence across the country of indigenous peoples, many of whom assert traditional claims to self-governance; and large immigrant communities, with over 18 percent of the people living in Canada having been born outside the country. Moreover, in contrast to some host countries whose immigrants come predominantly from one part of the world, creating a relatively homogeneous “Other,”
immigrants to Canada have come from many different parts of the world, creating a “diverse diversity” composed of a wide range of ethnicities, races and religions.

Canadian approaches to diversity are also shaped by the country’s larger geopolitical position and the traditional nation-building strategies on which it has relied since 1867. Immigration was a key ingredient in Canada’s first National Policy, which settled the West and secured Canada’s territory from “sea to shining sea.” From the very beginning, therefore, immigration has been central to our existence — geographically, economically and politically. Immigrants are us. In addition, geography insulates the country from some of the pressures of the twenty-first century. Buffered on three of its borders by oceans and on its southern border by the United States, itself an immigrant destination, Canada has not had to cope with high levels of illegal immigration. We are, as a result, less prone to concerns that immigration policy is “out of control,” a fear that has contributed to the politics of backlash in some other countries. The buffering effects are not absolute, to be sure. Anxieties about a “clash of civilizations” and about Muslim extremism have washed over our borders, contributing to a heightened security agenda and tensions with the United States over border management. However, Canada has been fortunate: Islamic radicalism is a small element in the Muslim community here, and Canadian foreign policy, especially the decision not to join the Iraq war, has eased the heightened tensions existing in some countries.

These multiple forms of diversity and historic geopolitical strategies have informed the ways in which Canadians think about both recognition and integration.

Recognition of Diversity
The recognition and accommodation of diversity have been central features of Canadian political history, and contemporary debates over multiculturalism are simply the continuation of an ongoing Canadian conversation. This tradition is grounded in historic commitments to French Canada and to the Aboriginal peoples, who both see themselves — and are increasingly seen by others — as distinct societies or “nations” within the Canadian state. These accommodations framed the cultural context in which Canada responded to new forms of diversity resulting from immigration during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, as Stuart Soroka and his colleagues observe in their chapter, the “thinner” sense of Canadian culture resulting from accommodations among the historic communities “may actually have benefits in a multicultural era, making it easier for new Canadians to feel comfortable here.”
Certainly Canadians have long understood both the benefits and ambiguities inherent in multiple forms of belonging, multiple views of history, multiple identities. The politics of the last half century have been dominated by efforts to recognize, accommodate and support evolving forms of cultural diversity, and to break down the ethnic and racial hierarchies described in The Vertical Mosaic, John Porter’s classic study of the distribution of power published in the mid-1960s (Porter 1965).

A complex array of instruments has been directed to this task. As Will Kymlicka emphasizes in his chapter, the legal and institutional forms vary for French Canada, Aboriginal peoples and immigrant communities. The result is three “silos” that have different histories, are enshrined in different sections of the Constitution, are codified in different pieces of legislation and are shaped by different concepts and principles. In the case of French Canadians, the key norms are duality, bilingualism, federalism, distinct society and nation. For Aboriginal peoples, the central concepts are treaty rights, inherent Aboriginal rights, title to land, self-government and self-determination. For immigrant minorities, the central ideas are diversity, multiculturalism, tolerance, antidiscrimination, citizenship and integration. These norms represent the foundation stones for very different formal structures in each case. In combination, however, they create a complex architecture of difference in Canada.

In addition, Canadian governments have adapted a variety of policies to nurture a multicultural definition of Canadian identity that spans all three dimensions of difference. Historically, this process involved a concentrated deemphasis of the historic “Britishness” of Canada through the removal of royal insignia from many public institutions and the adoption of a new national flag. But the process also involved the celebration of a multicultural conception of the country. This symbolic reordering has been reflected, for example, in the choice of the governor general, who as the Queen’s representative is the effective head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Since 1974, all governors general have come from non-British origins, and the last two appointments have been of visible minority women who were born outside the country and came to Canada as children. Similarly, the present lieutenant governor of Ontario is Aboriginal, and a number of other lieutenant governors in Ontario and other provinces are or have been visible minorities. In addition, the curricula in public schools in a number of provinces have been revised to highlight the contributions of minorities to Canadian history and culture, and the mandate of the public broadcasting system has also acquired a multicultural component. The Broadcasting
Act, 1968 requires the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), among other things, to reflect “the multicultural and multiracial nature of Canada.” The federal regulatory body that awards the CBC its licence requires the corporation “to report annually on its progress in implementing its commitment to ‘more adequately reflect the multicultural and multiracial nature of Canada and the special place of Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples, and to balance their representation on the air and in the work force in a manner that realistically reflects their participation in Canadian society, and that will help to counteract negative stereotypes’” (Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission 2000, 8).

Other policies have also sought to respect minority cultures. The federal government has formally apologized and offered redress for historic wrongs perpetrated against groups such as Japanese Canadians, Chinese Canadians and Aboriginal people who attended residential schools. In a similar vein, dress codes, which can kindle intense passions, have been adapted. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police revised its ceremonial dress code to allow Sikh officers to wear their turbans, and Sikhs may be exempted from mandatory motorcycle helmet laws or requirements for hardhats on construction sites. In a recent case, the decision of a Montreal school board to ban entirely the wearing of the kirpan, the Sikh ceremonial dagger, went as far as the Supreme Court of Canada. The court determined that the ban was disrespectful of people of the Sikh religion and set conditions under which a kirpan should be allowed. In addition, the clothing choices of Muslim women generate less controversy in Canada than in some other countries. Muslim women regularly wear the hijab and other coverings in Canadian schools, universities and public spaces without significant controversy.

Finally, governments have provided tangible support in various forms, including financial support for ethnocultural programs; funding for minority language instruction in schools; and affirmative action through the federal government’s employment equity program, which seeks to increase the representation of minorities in major educational and economic institutions.

Social Integration

Diversity also frames the way in which Canadians think about integration and community. Traditional approaches to social integration in many countries involved building a common national culture, including a uniform language, a consistent interpretation of history, a common set of traditions, a shared national identity and
singular loyalty. In Canada, such a definition of social integration would be immediately contested. As Gerald Kernerman (2005, 17) notes, “The embrace of diversity complicates the attempt to construct a common national identity, since there can be no explicit resort to a culturally, religiously or ethnically defined national identity.” Social integration in Canada cannot demand adherence to a common culture or a single identity. It does not try to turn Canadians into a single people. Indeed, even the language of “social and political integration” can be problematic. Rather, the predominant definition of the integration agenda focuses on the need to build a sense of belonging and attachment to a country that incorporates distinct identities.

In Canada, the twin agendas of recognition and community are best captured by the language of “shared citizenship.” Kymlicka encapsulates core elements of the idea of shared citizenship:

[It] goes beyond the sharing of citizenship in the formal legal sense (that is, a common passport) to include such things as: feelings of solidarity with co-citizens, and hence a willingness to listen to their claims, to respect their rights and to make sacrifices for them; feelings of trust in public institutions, and hence a willingness to comply with them (pay taxes, cooperate with police); feelings of democratic responsibility, and hence a willingness to monitor the behaviour of the political elites who act in our name and hold them accountable; and feelings of belonging to a community of fate (that is, of sharing a political community).

How is a sense of shared citizenship reinforced in a society without a common culture? Not surprisingly, the sources of shared citizenship are diverse. As the British sociologist T.H. Marshall reminded us more than half a century ago, the modern conception of citizenship has been enriched by a wider set of civil, political and social rights (Marshall 1950; also Jenson and Papillon 2001). Canadian discourse sees each of these sets of rights as important sources of integration. In the first place, diversity policies are framed by the essential principles of the liberal-democratic state and by the protection of the rights of individuals through the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, charters and codes in other provinces and human rights commissions. Central to the framework is the concept of equality expressed in section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter, which states that “every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” The contributions by Kymlicka
and Pearl Eliadis capture well this dimension of Canadian thinking. For Kymlicka, the values of liberal-democratic constitutionalism motivate, shape and constrain diversity policies in Canada. Eliadis states the view with more flourish, arguing that in the pursuit of a fair society, “human rights and equality rights offer a more promising avenue than multiculturalism alone ever could…When multiculturalism is unhinged from equality, it tends to careen off in unpleasant directions.”

Social rights, in the form of access to health, education and income protection, represent a second source of cohesion. The welfare state has long been recognized as an instrument of social integration, helping to mediate conflicts and preserve stability in divided societies. In the words of Siobhan Harty and Michael Murphy (2005, 43), national social programs “became closely associated with citizenship models because they are the outcome of decisions taken around the obligations we owe our compatriots: co-responsibility, the pooling of risk and social solidarity.” Marshall saw the welfare state as mitigating class divisions in Britain during the 1940s. In Canada, national social programs have also been seen as instruments of regional integration, creating networks of mutual support that span the country and reinforce the sense of a pan-Canadian community (Banting 1995). In the contemporary era, this integrative role extends to ethnic and racial differences. Commentators in some countries are increasingly skeptical that social policy can perform such a role, insisting that ethnic diversity tends to erode the social solidarity that sustains the redistributive state (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Goodhart 2004). While racial differences may in fact weaken support for social programs in some countries, including the United States, the proposition that there is a universal or inevitable tension among diversity, recognition and redistribution is unsustainable (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). In Canada, studies of public attitudes find little evidence that ethnic diversity erodes support for social programs (Soroka, Johnston, and Banting 2007).

Universal public services such as health care and especially education play particularly important roles in this process. The strength of Canadian public schools, which continue to attract children from the broad mass of the population, including most offspring of the professional class, is widely underappreciated in this context. For many young Canadians, diversity is first lived at school; how it is recognized and accommodated there is highly significant. Similarly, the strengths of the postsecondary system are critical to openness in Canadian society. Comparative analyses find that intergenerational mobility is higher in Canada than in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, rivalling levels
found in Scandinavia (Corak 2001, 2004; Solon 2002). Traditionally, the children of immigrants have shared in this intergenerational mobility. The educational attainments and economic outcomes of the children of immigrants who came to Canada before the 1980s were as good as, and in many ways better than, those of children whose parents were born in Canada (Aydemir, Chen, and Corak 2005).

Finally, Canadian discourse highlights the central role of civic engagement and political participation in the integration of minority communities. Contemporary Canada is defined by multiple communities and identities, and the critical question is how the conflicts inherent in such diversity are resolved or managed. From this perspective, a key to social cohesion is consensus on the fundamental processes of collective deliberation, especially the institutions of liberal democracy, and the active participation of minorities in the processes of governance. Disengagement or disaffection from these collective processes among ethnic minorities would be a potentially dangerous sign.

The fundamentals of this approach to social integration are hardly unique to Canada. One finds similar themes in the debates of other countries. In the case of political participation, for example, British commentators also underline the “contractual” nature of citizenship, including a minimum duty of political participation (Goodhart 2006, 33). Indeed, the case was perhaps expressed most eloquently in the 2003 Report of the “Life in the United Kingdom” Advisory Group, chaired by Bernard Crick:

When we use [the word] integration, we mean neither assimilation nor a society composed of...separate enclaves, whether voluntary or involuntary. Integration means not simply mutual respect and tolerance between different groups but continual interaction, engagement and civic participation whether in social, cultural, educational, professional, political or legal spheres. The basis of good citizenship is how we behave toward each other collectively and that is what binds us together, rather than assertions of national ethnic or religious priorities or particular interpretations of history. (United Kingdom, Home Office 2003, 12)

Despite these similarities, the Canadian approach to shared citizenship is distinctive in several ways. On one side, the celebration of diversity has become a feature of the country’s very conception of itself, part of the conception of the “nation” that newcomers are invited to join. On the other side, the celebration of shared traditions, history, values and identity represents a decidedly secondary element in the glue that holds the country together. For good or ill, Canada is a particularly postmodern country.
How well is Canada doing in achieving this conception of shared citizenship? Are our established approaches to recognition and integration working as well as we like to think? Or is our traditional model breaking down in important ways? What are the broad conclusions that flow from the analyses in this volume?

In his chapter, Kymlicka highlights the progress that has been made on recognizing and protecting diversity. There has been “a dramatic equalization” between francophone Quebecers and English-speaking Canadians, in part through the protection of French language rights by both the federal and Quebec governments. On Aboriginal rights, he argues that the federal government today accepts, at least in principle, that Aboriginal peoples “must have the land claims, treaty rights, cultural rights and self-government rights to sustain themselves as [distinct societies].” And as a result of multiculturalism and related policies such as employment equity, immigrant groups have achieved greater equality.

Kymlicka also points out that, despite this progress, some attempts at recognizing diversity have failed or moved forward with painful slowness. Notwithstanding major efforts, acknowledging Quebec’s distinctiveness within the Constitution has proven impossible. The adoption by the House of Commons of a resolution recognizing the Québécois as a “nation” within Canada in November 2006 may have represented a breakthrough in terms of political discourse, but as yet the country shows no appetite for constitutional recognition of Quebec’s distinctiveness. Moreover, although there has been growing acceptance of asymmetrical powers for Quebec in practice, little progress has been made on Quebec’s historic demands for enhanced constitutional powers. Similarly, Kymlicka notes that progress on Aboriginal land claims and self-government agreements has been “very slow and uneven,” a judgment echoed even more forcefully in the chapters by Daniel Salée and by Joyce Green and Ian Peach.

In the case of immigrant minorities, Kymlicka suggests the current policy framework may need to be updated to reflect the widely varying conditions of different groups. Historically, this silo was built on the assumption that all visible
minorities were disadvantaged, stigmatized or excluded. Today, however, anti-Black racism is qualitatively different from prejudice against other racial groups, and Islamophobia is qualitatively different from prejudice against other minority religions. Kymlicka suggests we need to pay more attention to the potential for increasing inequalities between different visible minorities as well as inequalities between visible minorities in general and White Canadians. In a similar vein, Salée points not only to the socioeconomic divide between the majority and ethnocultural minorities in Quebec but also to economic disparities between different minorities.

Variations also appear in the perceived levels of discrimination and vulnerability among racial minorities reported in the chapter by Jeffrey Reitz and Rupa Banerjee. Overall, a third of racial minorities report having experienced discrimination, a rate that varies from 28 percent of South Asians to 45 percent of Blacks (compared with 19 percent among Whites). More troubling, however, is the evidence that the sense of discrimination is higher among immigrants who have been in the country longer and among the children of immigrants. As Reitz and Banerjee note, the experience of the second generation is critical to the long-term effectiveness of the Canadian approach. While Canadian-born members of minorities may enjoy considerable educational and economic success, “their expectations of social acceptance, economic opportunity and equal partnership may be greater than that of their parents.”

These attitudinal patterns are consistent with the sorts of tensions that emerge in daily life. Examples include a number of cases of arson directed at Jewish and Muslim religious institutions, the overrepresentation of Blacks and Aboriginal persons in the prison system, as well as racial profiling and incidents of abusive police treatment of young men from those communities, which are highlighted in the contributions by Green and Peach and by Eliadis. As Eliadis observes, the 7,000 human rights cases filed every year and reports on systemic discrimination are as telling as survey data. Her summary of the evidence from the Ontario criminal justice system is compelling: police stop Blacks twice as often as Whites; Whites are less likely to be detained before trial than Blacks, particularly on drug charges; and Blacks are denied bail more often and convicted more often. Even for simple possession of drugs, Black men are sentenced to prison 2.5 times more often than whites.

Clearly, we have unfinished business in building a society that accommodates and respects difference. Recently, however, Canadians have also had to
revisit the limits of this agenda. As noted earlier, the core commitment of a liberal state to individual rights and equality motivates but also constrains diversity policies. These constraints emerged sharply in the recent debate over the role of Sharia law, discussed in the commentary by Marion Boyd. As Boyd underscores, a basic tension inherent in a multicultural society is how to accommodate the culture of minority groups and yet protect the rights of individuals who are members of those minority groups. This issue was posed in pointed form by the proposal from a well-known Islamic leader to incorporate a business in Ontario that would offer arbitration of family law matters according to Islamic principles. All “good Muslims,” proponents claimed, would be expected to have family matters resolved in this forum. The resulting debate divided both the Muslim community and the wider society, as some women’s groups in both communities insisted that the protection of gender equality should trump demands framed in the language of diversity. After a short but intense debate, the Ontario government passed legislation that prohibits faith-based arbitration. The debate highlighted the occasional tensions between the twin agendas of our diverse society.

Social Integration and Shared Citizenship

Backlash against multiculturalism in other countries has been driven by fears for social integration. Across Europe in particular, there is a widespread concern that policies designed to accommodate diversity have gone too far, and have even been harmful. In Joppke’s words, “The sense of failure is strong.” In part, these concerns reflect the economic marginalization of minorities and the consolidation in some countries of a minority underclass defined by unemployment, poverty, frustration and alienation. However, the concerns go well beyond economic exclusion. In many countries, young, middle-class members of minority communities who have been born and educated in Europe seem disaffected from central elements of the national culture. The response has been a growing insistence on social or “civic” integration, a model that stresses using the common language in daily life; respect for the values of liberal democracy and human rights; knowledge of the history, customs and traditions of the country; a commitment to its political institutions and processes; and a common sense of national identity.
Should Canada be concerned? This section looks at the evidence on the economic, social and political dimensions of integration.

**Economic Integration**

While the historic economic differences between English- and French-speaking Canadians have largely disappeared over the last half century, the economic integration of other minorities is widely seen as a serious issue. As Salée (2006, 5) has observed, despite 40 years of studies and national debates about their place within Canadian society, “Aboriginal people face socioeconomic challenges that, in many ways, are far more daunting than those to which the general population is exposed.” Although Canada as a whole regularly ranks at or near the top of the United Nations Human Development Index, First Nations on-reserve would rank 62nd, with some communities experiencing Third World conditions. Almost half of First Nations people on-reserves live in poverty, the unemployment rate is three times that in the non-Aboriginal community, and suicide is now among the leading causes of death among First Nations and Inuit children and youth.³ Poverty rates are also troubling off-reserve. In Regina and Saskatoon in 2000, the median total income of Aboriginal residents was only slightly more than half that of non-Aboriginal residents (Siggner and Costa 2005, 21).

Until recently, the economic performance of immigrants was seen as a Canadian success story. In contrast to the more heavily regulated labour markets in Europe, flexible labour markets in Canada have traditionally eased the entry of immigrants into the economic mainstream, with poverty rates among newcomers typically falling below the rate for the population as a whole within a decade or so. Since the 1980s, however, immigrants have not enjoyed the same economic success. There is now a substantial literature tracking deterioration in the incomes of recent immigrants relative to earlier cohorts, a decline that seems to have been experienced most strongly among immigrant men from nontraditional source countries. This erosion has taken place despite an immigration policy that gives greater weight to educational qualifications, with recent cohorts of immigrants having more years of education on average than native-born Canadians. The *Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants* found that only 40 percent of skilled principal applicants who arrived in 2000-01 were working in the occupation or profession for which they were trained, and many immigrants with university degrees were working in jobs that typically require high school or less (Reitz and Banerjee, this volume; Picot, Hou, and...
Economic difficulties have been compounded by changes in the welfare state that have reduced the level of income protection. The chapter on the American experience by Mary Waters and Zoua Vang details the extent to which migrants and their children have been formally denied a range of social benefits in the United States. Canada has not done so formally, but the general weakening of income protection can indirectly have the same effect. For example, changes in the Employment Insurance (EI) program in the mid-1990s significantly increased the amount of time new entrants to the labour force, including recent immigrants, must have worked before qualifying for unemployment benefits. As a TD Bank special report argues, this policy change, in combination with changes in the labour market and continued regional differentials in benefit rules, has eroded effective coverage dramatically in those parts of the country in which newcomers congregate (TD Economics 2005). In 2004, only 22.3 percent of the unemployed in Toronto received unemployment benefits; in Vancouver it was 25.7 percent and in Montreal 34.3 percent, compared with considerably higher numbers in Quebec City and St. John’s (Battle, Mendelson, and Torjman 2006; also Task Force on Modernizing Income Security for Working-Age Adults 2006). These added barriers to support are doubly important because eligibility for EI is a precondition for other labour market programs, including training programs and training allowances.

Canadian policy communities have seized on the issue of the economic integration of immigrants, and appropriately so. If the engine of economic integration continues to stall for many Aboriginal people and recent immigrants, Canadians may well experience the social tensions that have troubled other societies. Immigrants who were recruited to the country for their human capital are likely to be embittered if they are underemployed and undergoing deskilling. In consequence, the intergenerational mobility enjoyed by the children of immigrants who arrived before the 1980s may be at risk, especially for some groups such as Blacks. The result can only be higher levels of interethnic tension, putting under strain the wider societal consensus on the value of the multicultural conception of Canada.

Nevertheless, the chapters in this volume suggest that a concentration on economic integration is too narrow, and that we should also be concerned about the social and political dimensions of integration. We cannot assume that any fissures
in our sense of community are ultimately a reflection of economic problems alone. Our history should remind us that such an assumption would be wrong. The dramatic economic convergence between francophone Quebec and English-speaking Canada during the last half century has been accompanied by the growing strength of Quebec nationalism and sovereignist opinion in the province. The economic successes of Canadian-born Japanese Canadians, which are discussed below, did not reduce the intensity of their campaign for a formal apology and financial redress for the injustices done to them individually and collectively during the Second World War. Feelings of belonging, social solidarity and political community have a life of their own, and deserve attention in their own right.

Social Integration
On the positive side, there is little evidence of the deep social segregation feared in parts of Europe. Indeed, many of the traditional indicators of social integration that focus on social interactions and social behaviour remain relatively reassuring:

- While countries such as the Netherlands and Germany worry about minorities not learning the common language, Canada does not face the same problems, at least at the level of basic language proficiency. With English increasingly the international lingua franca and French another world language, immigrants to Canada usually have relevant language skills. In a survey of immigrants who arrived in Canada in 2000-01, fully 82 percent of respondents reported they were able to converse well in at least one of Canada’s two official languages when they first arrived (Statistics Canada 2003). In addition, an analysis of 1991 Census data revealed that almost half of male immigrants from non-English-speaking countries usually speak one of the official languages at home (Chiswick and Miller 2001).

- There is also little evidence of entrenched racial concentration in poor ghettos. While in his commentary, David Ley reports that immigrants accounted for 77 percent of the population of low-income census tracts in Toronto in 2001, a study tracking residential patterns over time in the city finds that Blacks and South Asians follow a traditional assimilation model. Initial settlement is often in low-income enclaves shared by their own and other visible minority groups, but in the longer term Black and South Asian migrants who are more affluent live in higher-income
neighbourhoods dominated by Whites. An exception to this pattern is the Chinese community. Recent Chinese immigrants tend to settle in established Chinese neighbourhoods that include more affluent and longer-term immigrants, forming comparatively dense ethnic neighbourhoods (Myles and Hou 2004). The evidence for Aboriginal people is similarly nuanced. Evelyn Peters’s chapter in this volume focuses on the level of concentration revealed by the 2001 Census and concludes that the conditions of isolation associated with underclass populations in US inner cities have not emerged here. John Richards’s commentary looks at changes in the level of concentration since 1981 and concludes that the degree of change in Saskatoon and Regina has been notable.

While rates of intermarriage (or mixed unions in the case of common-law couples) vary significantly across immigrant minorities, the 2001 Census revealed striking proportions of mixed couples among some minority communities: Japanese, 70 percent; Latin American, 45 percent; Black, 43 percent; and Filipino, 33 percent. The lowest rate was to be found among South Asians, at 13 percent (Milan and Hamm 2004). Despite these reassuring signs, new evidence in this volume presents more mixed signals. The chapters by Reitz and Banerjee and by Soroka, Johnston and Banting assess the attitudinal underpinnings of social integration by examining such sensitive social indicators as sense of belonging in Canada, sense of pride in the country, trust in other Canadians, shared social values and life satisfaction. The findings of the two analyses disagree on some key points, especially the extent to which the second generation of immigrant minorities is integrated in Canadian life, but both chapters raise serious questions about social integration in this country.

Soroka, Johnston and Banting adopt a broad perspective, exploring differences across all three dimensions of Canadian diversity. Their results remind us that the greatest challenges to social cohesion in Canada may still be rooted in the historic tensions among the founding peoples, rather than in the attitudes and attachments of newcomers. On dimensions such as pride in Canada, a sense of belonging in the country and trust in other Canadians, it is francophone Quebecers and Aboriginal people who on average feel less integrated into the pan-Canadian community. Soroka and his colleagues do discover differences across immigrant groups as well, although these often reflect how long members of those groups have lived in Canada. The longer new immigrants are in Canada, the more their sense of pride
and belonging comes to equal — and in some cases exceed — that of long established groups. With the exception of measures of interpersonal trust, they find little evidence that members of the second generation of immigrant minorities are less integrated into Canadian life. Nevertheless, their analysis also reveals troubling limits to the integrative power of time spent in Canada. Although newcomers from southern and Eastern Europe become progressively more comfortable in the country, visible minorities remain less confident that they fully belong here.

The chapter by Reitz and Banerjee concentrates on the experiences of racial minorities, comparing the attitudes and engagement of visible minorities with those of White counterparts, and distinguishing between the attitudes of recent and earlier immigrants and their children born in Canada. They conclude that social integration into Canadian society is slower for racial minorities than for immigrants of European origin, partly because of the sense of discrimination and vulnerability discussed earlier. But their most striking conclusion concerns second-generation minorities, whom they rightly describe as “the harbinger of the future.” Reitz and Banerjee find larger second-generation effects on a range of indicators of social inclusion, such as a sense of Canadian identity, a sense of belonging, life satisfaction and trust in other people. Their evidence leads them to conclude that educational and employment success by children of immigrants does not guarantee their social integration.

More research is essential. We need to sort through why findings differ on important issues, such as the level of integration of second-generation visible minorities. We also need to understand more fully the factors that shape the level of social inclusion and differences between minority groups. Reitz and Banerjee are clear that their effort to explain differences in the level of social integration across immigrant groups explains only a small part of the variation. Their findings on the role of perceived discrimination are important in underscoring the importance of antidiscrimination policies, especially as the findings are paralleled by studies comparing a number of countries (Berry et al. 2006). But there is still a large research agenda here.

**Political and Civic Engagement**

Engagement in political processes is also marked by strengths and weaknesses. On the positive side of the ledger, the rate of naturalization of newcomers, an essential step for participation in electoral democracy, is among the highest in the world. According to a 2005 study, 84 percent of eligible immigrants were Canadian
citizens in 2001; in contrast, the rate was 56 percent in the United Kingdom, 40 percent in the United States and lower still in many European states (Tran, Kustec, and Chui 2005). On the negative side of the ledger, however, some minorities do not participate fully in the Canadian political process. While Quebecers turn out for federal elections at rates similar to those of other Canadians, the chapter by Paul Howe finds a 14.5 percent gap in reported turnout between Canadian-born voters and immigrants who arrived since 1985 and are eligible to vote. There is also some evidence that voting rates for Aboriginal people are significantly lower than for other Canadians. According to an Elections Canada report, in the 2000 federal election the turnout rate for 296 polling stations located on-reserves was 48 percent compared with a national turnout of 64 percent. The report noted, however, that turnout in federal elections among Aboriginal voters varies across communities and provinces; in some cases, it is higher than for the Canadian population as a whole (Elections Canada 2004a).

The reasons why members of some racial minorities and Aboriginal communities are voting at lower rates than other Canadians are complex. In part, the differences may reflect a larger number of younger people in some groups: lower turnout among young people is ubiquitous throughout Western democracies. The chapter by Soroka and his colleagues finds that the voting gaps among Aboriginal people and several visible minority groups cease to be statistically significant when they control for age. But wider cultural factors may also be relevant. A lack of interest in politics and cynicism toward politicians may be higher within some minority groups than within the population as a whole. In some cases, abstention may be a political statement; for example, some First Nations people, as a matter of principle, never vote in federal or provincial elections. Lack of information and lower levels of political knowledge could also be factors. For example, Paul Howe finds that Canadian citizens who had arrived in the past 20 years scored considerably less well on his measure of political knowledge than other Canadians.

Turning out to vote is only one form of political engagement. Actual representation in Parliament, provincial legislatures, territorial assemblies and city and municipal councils is the surest way to ensure minorities’ voices are heard. Although there has been progress in the past decade or so, Canada has quite a way to go before the numbers of elected representatives from visible minorities and Aboriginal communities come close to their shares of the population. For example, following the 2004 federal election, visible minority members of Parliament filled only 7.1 percent of the
seats in the House of Commons, although they constituted 14.9 percent of the Canadian population (Black and Hicks 2006, 27). In part, this discrepancy reflects the parties’ relatively low number of visible minority candidates. For example, in 2004 the Liberal Party of Canada, which traditionally does well in urban areas with large minority populations, nominated a visible minority candidate in only four of the 19 constituencies in the Greater Toronto Area, a region in which visible minorities represent 37 percent of the population (Bird 2005, 82). Although it is often assumed that local politics is more accessible to minorities, this does not seem to be the case in Canada’s largest city. Following the November 2006 city council elections in Toronto, only four of the 45 councillors (8.9 percent) were from visible minorities. Aboriginal people are also underrepresented. In the 2004 federal election, six Aboriginal MPs represented 1.9 percent of the House of Commons membership, whereas 3.3 percent of Canadians identified themselves as Aboriginal in the 2001 Census. Moreover, the number of Aboriginal MPs dropped to five in the 2006 federal election (Smith 2006).

Engagement in civic associations has been celebrated as a means of building trust and enhancing the capacity for collective action in contemporary democracies (Putnam 2000). In the United States, there is troubling evidence that civic organizations have greater difficulty in bridging ethnic divisions as people living in ethnically diverse areas withdraw from all forms of community organizations, “hunkering down” in social isolation (Putnam 2004). So far, however, the evidence in Canada is less pessimistic. Existing studies find little evidence of significant hunkering down among Canadians living in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods (Soroka, Helliwell, and Johnston 2007). In addition, the chapter by Soroka, Johnston and Banting finds no significant variation across ethnic groups in participation in general-purpose social organizations, and the chapter by Reitz and Banerjee reports only a small racial gap in their measure of volunteering in voluntary organizations. Bonnie Erickson cautions in her commentary that some of the organizations in which minorities are involved (such as certain sports groups) may have an ethnically specific, rather than diverse, membership, leading to bonding rather than bridging social capital. However, the evidence that successful integration occurs when newcomers retain their ethnic identity and participate in wider society suggests that both bonding and bridging organizations have a role to play. The issue becomes the balance and interactions between the two. There is still much we need to learn in this area. In the meantime, it is important not to automatically transpose evidence from other countries to Canada.
Unfinished Business: Strengthening Shared Citizenship

The cumulative evidence is clear. Canada has unfinished business both in recognizing and respecting difference and in strengthening social integration. It is time to turn to the agenda for the future.

As in the past, the future of Canadian diversity policies will reflect Canadian realities. At the centre of these realities will be the diverse nature of Canadian diversity, as reflected in the three dimensions of difference. The current complex architecture of diversity policy cannot be reduced to a single model of Canadian citizenship. Francophone Quebecers will continue to seek a distinctive place in Canada, defined on one side by their Québécois political identity and on the other by a sense of attachment to the country as a whole. The First Nations will continue to seek a different relationship with Canada, one defined by treaty rights, the title to land and self-government. Immigrant minorities will bring a third orientation to the pan-Canadian community. Despite the growing strength of transnational identities and the small number of immigrants who may see Canadian status as a fallback position, the vast majority of immigrants still seek to integrate into Canadian life. While they will continue to seek room to sustain their cultural traditions and practise their religions, they are unlikely to want to build separate societies within Canada, complete with a full set of public institutions specific to each community. These variable political identities explain the persistence of the three silos of Canadian diversity policies. Even if we sought to consolidate our understandings in a single piece of legislation, such legislation itself would inevitably reflect the variable geometry of Canadian citizenship.

We do, however, need to reinforce the underlying sources of our shared citizenship, the common commitments that shape and constrain all three silos. In our earlier discussion of shared citizenship, we drew on Marshall’s conception of citizenship as embracing civil rights, political rights and social rights. In more contemporary language, shared citizenship in Canada is based on three equalities: the equality of individual rights or human rights, socioeconomic equality and political equality. These three equalities constitute the bedrock of the sense of a pan-Canadian community. Their implications may differ from one silo to another; and the problems facing different minorities may vary and require different responses.
But the underlying strength of the commitment cannot vary. The diverse Canadian approaches to diversity cannot stand if any silo is defined by discrimination, poverty and political weakness.

Advancing the three equalities addresses both the recognition and integration agendas. Efforts to increase the participation of minorities in judicial and political institutions, for example, recognize and legitimate the diversity they create by their presence in Canada, and foster their integration into our collective decision-making. The three equalities, as discussed here, certainly do not exhaust the diversity agenda. Strengthening links between Canada and Quebec, for example, certainly remains important. But the evidence does highlight the important aspects of the three equalities for the future of diversity in Canada.

This section explores issues central to each of the three equalities. None of the issues will be a surprise to specialists working in each of the various silos that define the diversity policy. Moreover, specific recommendations are beyond the scope of this volume. But we can provide an overview of the complexity of the challenges before us and highlight themes that run through them.

**The First Equality: Human Rights and the Justice System**

The immediacy of the human rights agenda is reinforced by the evidence in this volume about perceived discrimination among some visible minority groups, including second-generation children born and raised in Canada. While the battle against discrimination does not depend on the enforcement of rights alone, the justice system is a critical point of contact between the state and a diverse society. The institutions of justice stand as the primary protector of human rights, but their operations can also create frictions. To cite the most obvious example, tensions generated by charges of racial profiling by police forces, border agents and security agencies are corrosive of a sense of shared citizenship.

Key issues here include access, representation and structures. In his commentary in this volume, Roy McMurtry, chief justice of Ontario, expresses strong concern about equal access to justice in Canada. In his view, the increasing cost of litigation, cuts to legal aid, the termination of the Court Challenges Program
and the decline of pro bono work in major law firms are denying meaningful access to the justice system to Canadians with mid to low incomes. This trend has powerful implications for some minorities, especially Blacks and Aboriginal people, many of whom do not have meaningful access to the justice system.

Representation also matters. Again, McMurtry’s words capture the issue: “When Aboriginal people go to court, they expect to lose because they have been arrested by a White police officer, they are prosecuted by a White Crown attorney, and they are tried by a White judge and usually a White jury. In jail, they are supervised by White guards.” Of late, police have been under the spotlight, with major investigations in virtually every province and in every major urban police force. Many police forces have made progress in the recruitment of minorities, beginning particularly in the 1990s (Jain, Singh, and Agocs 2000). In the case of the RCMP, at the level of constables, Aboriginal individuals and visible minorities were close to or exceeded their proportion in the general Canadian population, in 2004. However, minority participation thinned out quickly in more senior ranks, and there was some evidence that momentum in recruitment was fading during the early 2000s (Royal Canadian Mounted Police 2005). Moreover, some major police forces in the country still have further to go, and sustaining the momentum is critical. However, the spotlight also needs to shine more brightly on other parts of the justice system. The legal profession is achieving greater gender balance, but it still does not reflect the country’s ethnic and religious diversity (Pendakur 1999). This limits the pool from which Crown prosecutors and judges come, as a glance at the makeup of the senior courts in Canada quickly confirms.

If the justice system does not reflect the society as a whole, pressure for more fully separate systems will grow, moving beyond, for example, the role of sentencing circles in Aboriginal communities. Some Muslims in Ontario supported the proposal for Sharia arbitration in part because of their lack of comfort with the formal system. McMurtry sees a similar imperative in the case of justice for Aboriginal people: “The remedy is not a separate justice system, which would be impractical, given the high percentage of Aboriginal persons living in urban communities. Instead, we need to ensure that Aboriginal people caught up in the justice system see more faces like their own.”

Changes in access and minority representation are probably more important than changes in formal structures. But now is not the time to weaken the
institutions with responsibility for antidiscrimination protections. The commentary by Pearl Eliadis reflects concerns that this is precisely what is happening. Until recently, the key human rights machinery at the federal level and in four provinces with substantial minority communities — Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan and British Columbia — included both a commission that investigates and helps parties resolve complaints and a courtlike tribunal to which complaints are referred if they are not resolved. However, in 2002 British Columbia abolished the commission, requiring complaints to go directly to the tribunal. In 2006, Ontario also abolished the two-step process, and individuals now must file claims directly with the Human Rights Tribunal. However, the Ontario changes allow organizations to bring applications on another’s behalf and retain the commission, which can intervene in any application before the tribunal and conduct general inquiries, such as its inquiry into the effects of racial profiling. The debate over whether these changes weaken human rights protections has been intense.

At the federal level, the government has taken the first step toward a notable extension of human rights legislation. In December 2006, the minister of Indian affairs and northern development introduced legislation to repeal section 67 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, 1985. That section prevented Aboriginal people living and working on-reserves from filing complaints with the Canadian Human Rights Commission against band councils or the federal government for decisions made under the Indian Act, 1985. The repeal of section 67 would grant First Nations people full access to the human rights protections that other Canadians have enjoyed since 1977.

Advancing the antidiscrimination agenda depends on other instruments as well. Multiculturalism programs, including antiracism initiatives, are important, as are the issues of economic and political integration discussed in the next sections. At the federal level, movement toward a broader approach began in the mid-1990s following the review of the multiculturalism programs of the Department of Canadian Heritage. Antiracism measures now occupy a larger part of the department’s programming. Moreover, in 2005 the Government of Canada issued Canada’s Action Plan against Racism (Department of Canadian Heritage 2005). In addition to committing federal departments and agencies to working together, the document emphasizes the importance of partnerships with civil society for a variety of initiatives to assist victims of discrimination, combat racism, counter hate messages and educate children and youth on diversity issues. Similarly, the Quebec
government is also taking a broad approach to racism and discrimination. In mid-2006, it launched a consultation process that is intended to lead to a government-wide policy on those questions (Quebec Éducation Loisir et Sport 2006).

In a diverse society, the commitment to human rights and fighting discrimination is central to both recognizing diversity and building community. There is a big agenda here: improving access to the courts by reinvesting in legal aid; enhancing minority representation in the justice system at all levels; strengthening human rights machinery; and sustaining antiracism advocacy and education.

**The Second Equality: Socioeconomic Equality**

As we have seen, the economic convergence between French- and English-speaking Canada, a major success of the mid-twentieth century, has yet to be replicated in the case of Aboriginal people, and the engine of economic integration is stalling for many recent immigrants. Moreover, the welfare state provides less support to those on the margins of economic life than in the past. Getting the socioeconomic framework right is critical to the future of Canadian diversity.

This challenge needs to be seen in the context of the larger evolution of the global economy and contemporary approaches to economic security. With the emergence of the so-called knowledge/information era, the traditional trade-off between the social and economic spheres has undergone a remarkable transformation. The optimal way to ensure both economic competitiveness and social cohesion is to pursue these goals in tandem. Two strategies are critical. First, human capital and knowledge are the touchstone of economic competitiveness and social inclusion in the twenty-first century. As Lester Thurow (1993) noted some time ago, “If capital is borrowable, raw materials are buyable, and technology is copyable, what are you left with if you want to run a high wage economy? Only skills, there isn’t anything else.” Part of the challenge is to ensure that people acquire knowledge and skills, that their skills and credentials are recognized, and that we break down discriminatory practices and other barriers that prevent them from using their skills to achieve a rewarding livelihood. Second, our tax and transfer systems and other social protections must ensure that those who lack human capital or face multiple barriers are protected, and that the gap between
rich and poor does not grow so wide as to undermine real equality of opportunity, including educational opportunity, for succeeding generations.

Within this larger context, the specific issues and responses differ among Aboriginal people, recent immigrants and visible minorities more generally.

**Aboriginal Well-Being**

Nowhere are the twin agendas of recognition and integration as intertwined as with Canada’s Aboriginal peoples. Yet Aboriginal inequality is not the product of any logical or inevitable tension between the two agendas. In practice, our collective political energies do shift from time to time between the two. But in the final analysis, we have not advanced either agenda adequately.

Since the adoption of the *Constitution Act, 1982*, through which Canada became the first advanced democracy to constitutionally recognize indigenous rights, the agenda of recognition and self-government has received considerable attention. Self-government has been seen as having priority, on the grounds that the economic development prospects of Aboriginal peoples depend on the achievement of self-government. First Nations, it is argued, need the autonomy to govern their own communities and set their own economic development and other priorities. Over time, the modification of the *Indian Act* has allowed band councils to assume somewhat greater powers, but the result is closer to self-administration than self-government, and does not give Aboriginal people sufficient control over their economic future. The 1992 Charlottetown Accord did propose the constitutional entrenchment of the inherent right of Aboriginal self-government, along with other major constitutional reforms, but it failed in a national referendum. Self-government was also one of the core principles of the 1996 *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples*. Although the federal government took some distance from the report, it did recognize, in a 1995 policy, that Canada’s Aboriginal peoples have an inherent right to self-government under the *Constitution Act, 1982* (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1995).

Notwithstanding the failure to constitutionalize self-government, negotiations between the federal government and a number of First Nations have led, as of 2006, to 20 comprehensive land claim agreements. These communities secured ownership for more than 600,000 square kilometres of land and some $2.4 billion in cash (Auditor General of Canada 2006, chap. 7). The important James Bay and Northern Quebec agreements date from the 1970s. All but three
of the 14 Yukon First Nations now have land claim and self-government agreements. The Inuit have done especially well, with the signing of agreements with the Inuvialuit of the Western Arctic in 1984, Nunavut in 1993 and the Labrador Inuit in 2003 — and, of course, the creation in 1999 of the public government in the new territory of Nunavut.

Elsewhere, however, the pace of land claim agreements has been exceedingly slow. For example, in British Columbia 47 such negotiations have been launched under a treaty process established in 1992, but only three final agreements had been initialed by the end of 2006, in addition to the 1999 Nisga’a Agreement (which was negotiated outside that process). While British Columbia’s 2005 “New Relationship” Accord may herald a new era, commentators, including former Yukon premier Tony Penikett (2006, 3), have criticized the lack of results and the large amount of money spent through the treaty process.

More recently, attention has shifted to achieving economic development and a better quality of life for Aboriginal people through other avenues. For example, in the Kelowna Accord of November 2005, the first ministers and national Aboriginal leaders agreed to a 10-year plan intended to improve Aboriginal quality of life in education, health, housing and economic opportunities; to that end, Prime Minister Paul Martin pledged $5 billion for the following five years. Following the change of government in 2006, implementation of the Kelowna Accord as a whole did not proceed, although the current Conservative government has made financial commitments in some of the policy areas identified in the accord. In British Columbia, a potentially significant change has been launched in the education field. As a result of a 2006 agreement, First Nations will be able to negotiate a Canada-First Nation Education Jurisdiction Agreement that will allow them to remove themselves from the relevant part of the Indian Act and assume jurisdiction for all levels of on-reserve education. In a knowledge-based economy, higher levels of education are critical to Aboriginal progress, as John Richards underlines in his commentary.

For the majority of Aboriginal people who live off-reserve (in 2001, 49 percent of Canada’s Aboriginal people lived in cities), public services such as education and health are provided by provincial and municipal governments. Provincial and municipal governments, sometimes in collaboration with the federal government (as in the Urban Aboriginal Strategy launched in 1998), are taking steps to improve the socioeconomic conditions of off-reserve Aboriginal people. In some cases, new frameworks are being developed to encourage greater
community autonomy, notably in economic development. For example, 28 urban reserves have been created in Saskatchewan since 1988.

Despite some progress, the agenda remains daunting. Self-government negotiations will not succeed unless governments demonstrate political will and commit the resources to allow Aboriginal people to open new doors. More concerted attention to the situation of Aboriginal people off-reserve is also essential. Without such changes, Aboriginal people’s sense of belonging to the Canadian community, which they helped found, is unlikely to grow.

**Economic Integration of Immigrants**

Here the issues are very different, as recent cohorts of immigrants have substantial human capital. Not surprisingly, much attention has been focused on the “discounting” of foreign education, credentials and experience. A recent study carried out for the IRPP concluded that, on average, a foreign university degree held by a non-White immigrant has a return worth less than one-third that of a degree obtained in Canada by a native-born Canadian (Alboim, Finnie, and Meng 2005). Other factors are also at work. The 1980s and 1990s saw an expansion of the numbers of Canadian-born university graduates coming into the labour market, generating stronger competition for skilled jobs. Increasing attention is also being focused on the language proficiency of immigrants, especially in more technical fields. And, undoubtedly, some element of the growing problems of immigrants reflects racial discrimination in the labour market. Certainly, racial minority immigrants face additional obstacles such as isolation in certain “occupational enclaves” and lack of access to social networks with the linkages necessary to assist them in finding good jobs (Reitz 2005).

Progress will require a much more sophisticated approach to immigrant integration than we have relied on until now (Alboim and McIsaac 2007). To a large extent, existing programs focus on reception needs of new arrivals rather than on the labour market entry needs of more educated immigrants. More recent policy innovations target the recognition of credentials. Provincial governments have the constitutional authority to regulate trades and professions, and some of them are beginning to tackle the issue. In 2006, the Ontario government passed Bill 124, creating a new *Fair Access to Regulated Professions Act*, which obliges 34 regulated professions, including physicians, accountants, lawyers, teachers, engineers and social workers, to adopt registration practices that are “fair, transparent and expeditious.” Quebec is also moving on the file. After reports from advisory bodies in 2004 and 2005, a bill was also moving in
the National Assembly to amend the *Code des professions* to allow professional orders to issue three new kinds of permits in order to facilitate the professional integration of people educated or trained outside Quebec. The federal government has also begun steps to create a Canadian Agency for Assessment and Recognition of Credentials. Despite the agency’s name, it will focus primarily on the provision of information and referral services for credential assessment rather than on providing the assessment itself. These initiatives need to be complemented by “bridging” courses in colleges and universities, in which arriving professionals can top up their previous training.

While these initiatives are useful, the problems are much broader. Formal qualifications matter to regulatory bodies and universities, but employers are more interested in the competencies for which formal qualifications normally serve as a proxy. The strongest predictor of economic success among immigrants is not formal credentials but the level of ability in one or the other of Canada’s official languages. For immigrants educated elsewhere, especially those in professional occupations, the requirements go well beyond basic English or French. Employers want employees who can not only read, write and express themselves in sophisticated ways, but who can also solve problems and work in teams, all of which require both command of technical vocabulary and understanding of cultural context and nuance.

Governments are only now coming to grips with this issue. There is a growing recognition of the need for advanced language training geared to labour market integration. However, the level of training currently provided varies dramatically across the country, and bringing existing programs up to the general standard required for labour force participation, let alone for specific professional sectors, will require a substantial additional investment. It will be a long time before we have a system across the country that can properly assess newcomers and steer them to courses appropriate to their professional sector. In addition, because some recent immigrants have difficulty accumulating enough hours of employment to qualify for Employment Insurance, they are not eligible for training allowances and often cannot afford to take advantage of federally funded courses, even when these are free, because they have to work to support themselves and their families.

The discounting of foreign work experience is best overcome by Canadian work experience. Governments have taken some limited steps along this path. For example, the Ontario government has invested more than $34 million since 2003 in 60 “bridge training” projects, many of which include work placements, to help newcomers work in some 100 trades and professions. Also, in 2006, the
province promised to create an internship program for internationally trained individuals, placing them in up to 70 six-month internship assignments in ministries and Crown agencies. But such initiatives remain extremely modest. More powerful would be a program of incentives to encourage all employers to give newcomers the first Canadian job in which to develop and demonstrate their capacity to communicate and work effectively in Canada.

Not surprisingly, the size of the integration challenge is deflecting pressure back to immigration policy and the criteria governing immigrant selection. A number of changes are under debate. Federal-provincial agreements are being adjusted to allow international students studying in Canada, who will have domestic credentials and a substantial head start on their integration process, to work longer after graduation and to apply for immigrant status from inside the country. More radical options are also in the air. One idea is to adopt the new Australian model, making recognition of foreign credentials and competence in one of the official languages formal requirements for selection, a proposal that might have significant implications for the source countries for immigration to Canada. Employers are also taking a larger role. Applicants already receive significant additional points in the selection process if they have arranged employment; trade agreements create greater scope for employer-employee driven admissions; and provincial nominee programs are used to meet employer requests. Recently, however, there has been a large increase in the number of employers relying on the temporary workers program to achieve prompt results, not only for unskilled labour but also for professional employees.

Finally, the socioeconomic well-being of immigrants would be enhanced by the strengthening of social programs benefiting all workers. Several ways forward have been identified. The rules governing eligibility for EI might be eased for new entrants to the labour force, including immigrants, especially if EI is to remain the platform for a wider range of labour market programs. Alternatively, a new set of programs might be introduced to address the labour market needs of non-EI-eligible workers, including most immigrants (Battle, Mendelson, and Torjman 2006; Task Force on Modernizing Income Security for Working-Age Adults 2006). In addition, unskilled immigrants — and skilled immigrants trapped in unskilled jobs — would benefit from a serious effort to support all low-wage workers through income transfers. Some progress has been made on this agenda through the Canada Child Tax Benefit and the National Child Benefit, and the proposals for a working income tax benefit would also assist low-income workers, including many immigrants.
Economic Well-Being and Visible Minorities

Since their inception, employment equity policies have reflected the assumption that the danger of economic marginalization is not limited to immigrants but persists in subsequent generations. However, studies of Canadian-born visible minorities are challenging this assumption and revealing striking differences across groups. Krishna Pendakur and Ravi Pendakur examine the average earnings of Canadian-born men and women in different ethnic groups from 1971 to 1996, controlling for a variety of factors including age and schooling. They find that Japanese-Canadian men and women enjoyed higher average earnings than their counterparts of British origin consistently throughout this period; the same is true for Chinese-Canadian women, and by 1996 Chinese-Canadian men’s earnings were equal to those of Canadians of British origin. In contrast, Black and Aboriginal workers face dramatic earnings gaps, and those gaps grew in the 1990s (Pendakur and Pendakur 2002). Similar conclusions emerge from a study by Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson (2006). Using 2002 data, they conclude that among Canadian-born workers there was no significant wage gap between visible minority and nonvisible minority workers as general categories. Breaking down the concept of visible minority, however, revealed a dramatic disadvantage for Black men and Latin American men.

These findings lead both sets of authors to reflect on the concepts normally utilized to analyze disadvantage and design policy responses. “Given that in 1986 almost half of Canadian-born working-age visible minorities were of Chinese or Japanese origins, this suggests that the visible minority category is somewhat blunt” (Pendakur and Pendakur 2002, 509).10 Hum and Simpson (2006) extend the questioning to the policy level: “At the very least, our findings should sound a warning that treating visible minorities as a homogeneous group for public policy, particularly employment equity, is ill advised...The persistent disadvantage facing black men in Canada (and now, Latin American men) should no longer be submerged in a multicultural discourse nor confined exclusively within a ‘visible minority’ context.” It is time for a national debate on how we define and respond to disadvantage in this country.

Underlying all of these challenges is the commitment to socioeconomic equality. Intriguingly, the role of human capital in the points system for selecting immigrants can be seen as a metaphor for a broader societal commitment to all Canadians, both those who come from abroad and those who are born here. While we need not go as far as Courchene (2001) when he argues for a Charter of Children’s Human Capital Rights to inform our policy decisions in this area, it...
is nonetheless the case that some similar social vision ought to be part of Canadian citizenship in the twenty-first century.

**The Third Equality: Political and Civic Participation**

As we have seen, eligible voters from Aboriginal and immigrant communities vote less often than other Canadians and are underrepresented in legislative bodies across the country. Both these questions deserve attention, as does the role of civil society organizations in promoting inclusion and shared citizenship.

**Electoral Participation**

Some election-management bodies have been reaching out to electors in communities with lower than average voting rates. Over the years, Elections Canada has developed a range of measures to facilitate voting by members of ethnocultural communities and Aboriginal people. These include communications activities; providing information about the electoral process in languages in addition to French and English (including a number of Aboriginal languages); and appointing community relations officers who distribute information, carry out liaison with community organizations and facilitate voting (see box 1).

In their chapter in this volume, Marc Hooghe, Tim Reeskens and Dietlind Stolle raise the idea of granting newcomers who have not yet become citizens the right to vote in local elections. This right exists in a number of European countries, and in some other countries the question is being debated (see box 2). Hooghe, Reeskens and Stolle do not see such limited voting rights as merely symbolic:

Voting rights enhance the social status of immigrants and perhaps positively influence their trust levels, increase their participation in social-political life and afford them a better association with majority populations. Therefore, from a policy perspective, our research suggests that in the interest of social cohesion, granting voting rights is a step in the right direction.

Because of the high rate of naturalization of immigrants in Canada, such proposals have received less attention here. Nevertheless, some have suggested moving in this direction. For example, in October 2006, Toronto mayor David Miller said...
that permanent residents should be given the right to vote in municipal elections. Such a change would allow newcomers to become familiar with the electoral process, and they might be more inclined to participate in federal, provincial and territorial elections once they become citizens. This proposal clearly merits further research and public debate.

**Representation of Minority Communities**

Research demonstrates that the representation of minorities in legislatures depends to a considerable degree on their capacity to be nominated as party candidates. This is particularly true when minorities are concentrated in specific areas rather than dispersed. Reforms thus tend to concentrate on measures that will facilitate their access to party nomination. Although it has been suggested that political parties should be required by law to choose more members of minorities as candidates, some parties have taken steps in this direction, such as setting targets. Others advocate changes in electoral laws. Some contend that proportional representation would provide incentives for parties to nominate more candidates from minorities (Law Commission of Canada 2004, 114). However, that would depend on the rules of the particular voting system and, as at present, decisions by the parties. Another route is through public funding of political parties. For example, the Quebec government’s draft Election Act (tabled in December 2004), which

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### BOX 1

**Elections Canada: Outreach Initiatives for Ethnocultural Communities and Aboriginal People — 2004 General Election**

#### Ethnocultural communities

Returning officers were authorized to appoint *ethnocultural community relations officers* in any electoral district in which at least 10 percent of the population had origins in China, India or the Philippines. In total, 59 such officers were appointed in 48 of the 50 eligible electoral districts.

Messages about the electoral process and how to vote were designed to attract specific groups, and a wide range of formats and languages were used.

#### Aboriginal communities

Returning officers were authorized to appoint *Aboriginal community relations officers* in any electoral district with a Métis settlement, at least one Aboriginal reserve, an Inuit hamlet or a friendship centre, or in which Aboriginal people made up at least 5 percent of the population. In total, 164 such officers were appointed in 124 of the 137 eligible electoral districts.

More than 600 polls were established on First Nations reserves and in Inuit and Métis communities, and 39 in friendship centres.

Under the Aboriginal Elder and Youth Program, elders and youth offer information and assistance to voters who may not be familiar with the federal electoral process. In the 2004 election, 173 elders and 182 youth were present at 262 polling stations in 48 electoral districts.

Source: Elections Canada 2004b, 41-42.
proposed a semiproportional electoral system, included provisions to increase public funding for parties that nominated a sufficient number of non-francophone candidates.

There have also been proposals to enhance the representation of Aboriginal people in our legislatures. In its 1991 report, the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing drew on New Zealand’s experience since 1867 with seats designated for the Maori, which is described in Roger Maaka’s chapter. The commission recommended that a number of seats in the House of Commons be designated for Aboriginal people. The number of seats would vary depending on the level of registration on an Aboriginal electoral list. About the same time, Thomas Courchene and Lisa Powell (1992) proposed the creation of a “First Nations province” (FNP) comprising First Nations reserves across the country. This idea is premised on First Nations achieving self-government and becoming, in effect, an order of government analogous to other provinces. As in other provinces, members of Parliament would be elected from constituencies in the FNP in line with their population. Moreover, the elected leader of the FNP would be considered a first minister, participating in intergovernmental deliberations, and the FNP would have members in the Senate. None of these proposals has found significant support among Aboriginal leaders, perhaps because such reforms are seen as in conflict with the pursuit of self-government (Williams 2004). However, they have not had the same degree of public and expert discussion as some of the reforms mentioned above.

**BOX 2**

**Voting Rights for Noncitizens in Local Elections in Europe: Examples of Legal Provisions and Recent Debate**

Ireland: All non-Irish adults who are registered as residents have had the right to vote in municipal elections since 1963.

Denmark: Those who have been resident for three years have been allowed to vote in local elections since 1981.

Sweden: Foreigners resident for three years have been allowed to vote in local and regional elections, and in some national referendums, since 1975.

The Netherlands: Voting in local elections after five years as a resident has been allowed since 1985 (since 1979 in Rotterdam).

Finland: Immigrants resident for two years have been allowed to vote in local elections since 1996 (from 1991 to 1996, those resident for four years had this right).

Spain: In February 2006 the Spanish Congress of Deputies unanimously approved a motion to study the legal reforms that would be needed to enable immigrants resident in Spain to participate in the next municipal elections.

France: Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy has indicated he favours regularized immigrants being allowed to vote in municipal elections.

Sources: www.immigrantvoting.org/material/world.html; http://users.skynet.be/suffrage-universel/indexvo01.htm
There is thus no shortage of proposals that could reduce the representational deficits of ethnocultural minorities and Aboriginal peoples. There is, however, a need for more serious debate on possible measures and the degree to which the benefits claimed by their advocates would actually occur.

**Civil Society Organizations**

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can also contribute to promoting inclusion and shared citizenship. As mentioned above, integration is most effective when newcomers maintain attachment to their ethnic identity and participate in the wider society. This implies that both organizations in which members of a particular ethnic group bond with each other and organizations that bridge across ethnic communities have roles to play. In this regard, the proposition that ethnic diversity leads to a withdrawal from such organizations does not seem to be borne out in Canada.

A large number of nongovernment organizations are involved in assisting recent arrivals not only to find productive employment but also to adapt to their new environment (see, for example, the discussion of Vancouver’s SUCCESS in David Ley’s commentary). Such organizations are close to the immigrants and refugees with whom they are involved, and in many cases they can help ease integration into Canadian life by providing advice and assistance in the newcomers’ mother tongue. Recent research confirms the importance of such networks. Irene Bloemraad (2006) compares the integration of the Vietnamese and Portuguese communities in Boston and Toronto, and concludes that the two ethnic groups are better integrated in terms of civic and political participation in Toronto than in Boston. The explanation lies at least in part in the fact that Canada’s multiculturalism policy has encouraged the creation of a network of institutions that link immigrants to the larger society.

Unfortunately, according to a recent study, such settlement programming in Canada has been hampered by limited funding and government-imposed constraints on the design and delivery of settlement services by nongovernmental organizations. To allow agencies to have more autonomy to introduce programs that meet locally identified needs, program funding tied to the delivery of specific services should be supplemented by multiyear funding (Wayland 2006, 19).

Civil society organizations can also promote civic literacy within both minority communities and Canadian society as a whole. In the past decade, a number of organizations have emerged with a mission to enhance the degree to which Canadians, particularly youth, understand their country and its history, including the Historica
Foundation (launched in 1999) and the Dominion Institute (established in 1997). Other civil society organizations are helping foster key values of citizenship among young Canadians. For example, since 2003 Student Vote has organized mock elections in schools as a way of encouraging young Canadians to develop a habit of voting.

Another area in which civil society organizations are active is the sponsorship of youth exchanges. Some exchanges are community based, with a local service organization supporting the travel and related costs for youth to visit another part of Canada. Other exchanges are coordinated by a national body, a number of which are funded by Exchanges Canada. One of the key principles underlying exchanges is that people can better understand difference by experiencing it. There is evidence this evolution does indeed occur. As diversity has come to be viewed more widely, exchanges have expanded beyond official language groups. For example, the SEVEC Youth Exchanges Canada program now has an Aboriginal Exchange Program, one of the objectives of which is to “connect and facilitate interactions between Aboriginal youth and non-Aboriginal youth and/or those from a different Aboriginal culture” (SEVEC 2005, 11).

Youth exchanges and other activities of civil society organizations bring together people from different social and cultural backgrounds and help build civic literacy. This sector’s potential contribution to shared citizenship merits deeper consideration by policy-makers and researchers. Should some public funding for nongovernmental organizations be targeted toward minority communities where such organizations are not as extensive? Are the creativity and energy of civil society organizations being sapped by the growing emphasis on project (rather than core) funding and tighter accountability requirements? Should the federal and other governments, as well as the private sector, provide more generous support for exchange programs and youth forums? How do such activities link to the role of the education system in helping young Canadians understand their country and each other? These and other questions deserve greater attention as part of efforts to realize more fully the potential of civic participation both within and across diverse communities.

Final Thoughts

Is the Canadian approach to diversity broken? This very question misunderstands the Canadian approach to diversity. Any summary assessment of the strengths and
weaknesses of our approach to ethnic diversity will inevitably vary across the three dimensions of difference. The position of the Québécois, although not a central focus of this volume, remains at the heart of Canadian political life. As the chapter by Soroka and his colleagues reminds us, the deepest divisions may be not between “new” Canadians and “old” Canadians, but between the founding peoples of the country. Although relations between Canada and Quebec have absorbed much of the political energies of the last half century, we still have not resolved the tensions surrounding the recognition and accommodation of Quebec nationalism within Canada.

An even more critical judgment is appropriate in the case of the position of First Peoples in Canada. Outside of the North, progress on the agenda of title to land and self-government has been painfully slow; and the record on the economic and social well-being of Aboriginal people is a national failure.

Much of the current debate swirls around immigrant integration and the well-being of visible minorities, and this volume provides evidence of important tensions here. In this area, however, a sense of proportion is required. Canada is not “sleepwalking into segregation.” There is no justification for a U-turn in multiculturalism policies comparable to that underway in some European countries. There is no reason to assume the agendas of recognition and integration are in conflict. Nevertheless, the warning signs cannot be ignored. Policy debates have seized on the importance of economic integration, and there is no question that progress here is essential. However, economic integration, on its own, is not sufficient. The evidence in this volume is clear that economic success does not guarantee social integration. Feelings of belonging and engagement, a sense of mutual support and commitment, and participation in a common political community require separate attention and support. The agenda is multifaceted: reinforcing the machinery to protect human rights and fight discrimination; enhancing minority representation in critical institutions such as the justice system; and stronger efforts to encourage minorities to participate more extensively in the political life of the country.

Although summary evaluations are inevitably framed within the context of each dimension of difference, peering across the silos adds insight. One is inevitably struck by the persistent disadvantage of Black and Aboriginal individuals on many of the dimensions of inclusion examined in this book: the sense of belonging and pride in Canada, levels of perceived discrimination, interactions with the justice system, employment and labour market earnings, and political engagement. At the
same time, some ethnic minorities perform as well as or better than the Canadian average on many of these same measures. It would seem to be time for a national debate on the bluntness of categories such as “visible minority” and the desirability of more targeted policy responses to disadvantage in Canada.

Peering across the silos also clarifies what instruments are available to governments and civil society to strengthen our shared citizenship. Governments have little direct influence over social attitudes, such as feelings of belonging, trust, solidarity, pride in country and sense of identity. To a limited degree, policies can direct the education system and public broadcasting to celebrate shared values and tolerance, and civil society organizations can contribute through educational initiatives and exchanges to enhance mutual understanding and a sense of Canadian history. Symbols of nationhood, however, cannot be the only glue holding the country together. In a bilingual, multinational federal state, there are definite limits to our capacity to engage in nation-building enterprises.

Hence our stress on the three equalities as the bedrock of our shared citizenship. We build respect by respecting difference; we build tolerance by resisting discrimination; we build trust by being trustworthy; we build belonging by drawing people into the mainstream of civic and political life; we build solidarity by supporting all Canadians in need. Building shared citizenship is an ongoing task, especially in a diverse society, but there is good reason to hope that these fundamentals will sustain this distinctive Canadian project in the future.
Notes

1 We would like to thank Grant Holly and Laura O’Laughlin for the excellent research assistance they provided during the preparation of this chapter. We are also grateful for the insightful comments on earlier drafts we received from Naomi Alboim, Pearl Eliadis, Siobhan Harty, Will Kymlicka and France St-Hilaire. Any errors of fact or interpretation are our responsibility.

2 According to the Court, the kirpan must be worn under the clothes and sewn into a sheath; *Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys* (2006) SCC 6.


4 It is troubling that minorities represented a smaller share of RCMP cadets in the early 2000s than their share of the constable ranks in 2004, implying a slowing of momentum (Royal Canadian Mounted Police 2005).

5 The *Constitution Act, 1982* recognizes and affirms the existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of Aboriginal peoples (section 35(1)). Section 35(2) defines the Aboriginal peoples of Canada to include the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples, and section 35(3) defines treaty rights to include “rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.”


7 The May 2006 budget provided $450 million in additional funding for education, water and housing, and for women, children and families.

8 At the time of writing (January 2007), this bill had not yet been passed. For a description of the mandates and other aspects of the two consultative bodies established by the Quebec government in 2004 and links to their reports, see Québec, Immigration et Communautés culturelles, “Accès des immigrants aux professions et métiers réglementés” at www.micc.gouv.qc.ca/fr/presse/index.html


10 Pendakur and Pendakur also note, however, that there is heterogeneity in earnings across the country, and that although Chinese men do well in Vancouver, where the Chinese community is large, they face earnings gaps in Toronto and Montreal. They therefore add that “the case for the bluntness of the (visible minority) category is partially driven by the heterogeneity of earnings across cities” (Pendakur and Pendakur 2002, 510).

11 The study noted that immigrant-serving agencies are constrained by a lack of stable core funding and must rely on service delivery contracts for language training and other programming, often on a year-to-year basis. Such contracts “often involve increased accountability requirements with little or no flexibility in program delivery or funding” (Wayland 2006, 17). These difficulties are not unique to immigrant-serving organizations. As Susan Phillips (2006, 26), a leading scholar of the voluntary sector, has noted, the tightening of the federal government’s accountability regime in 2000 following the controversy over grants and contributions at Human Resources Development Canada “exert[s] top-down controls that reinforce the principal-agent nature of these relationships and greatly reduce the autonomy of voluntary organizations.”

12 Henry Milner (2002, 2) defines civic literacy as “the knowledge and skills to act as competent citizens.”

13 Exchanges Canada is a unit within the Department of Canadian Heritage; see
According to post-exchange questionnaires, 99.6 percent of group organizers for the SEVEC Youth Exchanges Canada program agreed that the exchanges gave participants a better appreciation of Canada’s diversity (SEVEC 2005, 8).

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